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ABSTRACT 
 
The end of the Cold War, marked by the shift from a bipolar to multipolar security 
order, prompted a significant change in Japan’s relations with Africa. New political and 
economic challenges, which are accelerated by the process of globalisation, have forced 
Japan to adjust its foreign policies accordingly- especially in the African context. The 
primary goal of this study is to analyse how the concept of human security has 
influenced Japan’s foreign policy towards Africa since 1998. This research question 
focuses on Official Development Assistance (ODA) and peacekeeping through the 
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Africa. The methodological nature of this 
study is qualitative. Secondary sources are mainly used. This study makes use of the 
two contending theoretical perspectives in the security paradigm, namely Neo- Realism 
and the Human Security Approach. 
 
An important part of the analysis is Japan’s middlepowership and why it has chosen 
human security as its niche diplomacy in the new security order. The findings of this 
study suggest that the reasons for this are, firstly that Japan has had to justify its 
continuing ODA cuts to Africa over the last decade, as well as its pacifist stance on 
peacekeeping, which sees it refraining from directly intervening in conflict situations. 
Other key findings of this study are that Japan’s motives for providing ODA to Africa 
prior to 1989 were mainly economic in nature and that diplomatic relations were 
limited. What also emerged from this study is that Japan’s most prominent foreign 
policy goals include a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, 
establishing itself as a prominent global player both in political and economic realms, 
and securing favourable relations with states whose resources are vital to its expanding 
economy. Japan’s more recent relations with Africa can also be characterised by its 
multilateral approach, particularly through organisations such as the United Nations and 
the African Union. Important initiatives such as the Tokyo International Conference on 
African Development (TICAD) have also played an important role in promoting 
African development. However, its future success will depend on coordinating TICAD 
and The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) policies, with human 
security as a common goal.  
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The implications of the findings of this study are that Japan will have to formulate a 
more coherent foreign policy on security, especially towards Africa. Secondly, since 
Japan is no longer the ODA giant that it used to be, it will have to find new ways of 
defining its relationship with Africa, particularly in terms of TICAD and the G8. Future 
research could expand the analysis to an investigation of Japan’s ODA disbursements 
to all Africa countries. Additional attention should also be given to Japan’s foreign 
policy in terms of peacebuilding, and how the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) is 
formulating these policies. Lastly, more research can be conducted on human security 
in general, and other aspects of it that are promoted through Japan’s foreign policy.  
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OPSOMMING 
 
Die einde van die Koue Oorlog het belangrike veranderinge teweeg gebring in Japan se 
bande met Afrika. Dit is meestal as gevolg van die skuif van ‘n bipolêre na ‘n 
multipolêre sekuriteitsorde. Die gevolg hiervan is dat Japan, deels weens globalisering, 
verskeie nuwe politieke en ekonomiese uitdagings in die gesig staar. Japan moes ook sy 
buitelandse beleid daarvolgens aanpas – veral teenoor Afrika. Die primêre doel van die 
studie is om die invloed van die konsep menslike veiligheid op Japan se buitelandese 
beleid sedert 1998 te analiseer. Dié navorsingsvraag sal hoofsaaklik fokus op Japan se 
amptelike regeringshulp, of ODA (Official Development Assistance) en vredesmagte 
wat deur middel van die Verenigde Nasies in Afrika ontplooi word. Die metodologie 
van die studie is hoofsaaklik kwalitatief, en sekondêre bronne word gebruik. Twee van 
die belangrikste teorieë in die debat rondom sekuriteit, Neo-Realisme en die Menslike 
Veiligheids Benadering word in die konteks van die studie bespreek.  
 
Japan as ‘n middelmoondheid word bespreek, en hoekom die land menslike veiligheid 
gekies het as primêre fokus vir sy buitelandse beleid. Die bevindinge van die studie 
impliseer dat Japan se motiewe vir sy bande met Afrika voor 1989 hoofsaaklik 
ekonomies van aard was, al was diplomatieke kontak beperk. In die nuwe multipolêre 
orde het Japan se fokus egter geskuif na sy politieke belange. Dit sluit ‘n permanente 
posisie in die Veiligheids Raad van die Verenigde Nasies in, om die land as ‘n politieke 
en ekonomiese gesag te vestig in die globale politieke ekonomie, en laastens om goeie 
verhoudings te handhaaf met lande wat oor natuurlike bronne beskik wat van uiterste 
belang is vir Japan se groeiende ekonomie. Japan se meer onlangse bande met Afrika 
kan ook as multilateraal van aard beskryf word, veral deur organisasies soos die 
Verenigde Nasies en die Afrika Unie. Initiatiewe soos die Tokyo Internasionale 
Konferensie oor Afrika Ontwikkeling (TICAD) het tot dusvêr ook ‘n belangrike rol 
gespeel om ontwikkeling in Afrika te bevorder. TICAD se toekomstige sukses sal egter 
bepaal word deur of TICAD en die Nuwe Ekonomiese Vennootskap oor Afrika se 
Ontwikkeling (NEPAD) se beleide gekoördineer kan word met menslike veiligheid as 
oorkoepelende doel. 
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Die implikasies van die bevindinge van die studie is dat Japan sy buitelandse beleid sal 
moet herformuleer om dit minder teenstrydig te maak aangaande kwessies rakende 
sekuriteit. Tweedens, aangesien Japan nie meer die ODA - reus is wat dit ‘n paar jaar 
gelede was nie, sal die land nuwe maniere moet vind om sy verhouding met Afrika te 
definieër, veral in die konteks van TICAD en die G8. Toekomstige navorsing wat meer 
uitbrei oor Japan se ODA na alle Afrika lande kan bydrae tot bestaande literatuur. Daar 
is ook ‘n vraag na navorsing oor hoe die Ministerie van Buitelandse Betrekkinge 
(MOFA) sy buitelandse beleid aangaande vredesbou operasies formuleer. Laastens, 
meer navorsing kan ook gedoen word oor menslike veiligheid in die algemeen, asook 
ander aspekte daarvan wat bevorder word deur Japan se buitelandse beleid. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
 
1.1 Introduction to research problem  
 
A fundamental change has taken place in the debate on international security since the 
end of the Cold War. The traditional concept of security has been generally viewed in the 
context of national, state-centric security in international relations. The end of the Cold 
War and the proliferation inter alia of civil wars and new forms of insecurity have 
brought forth the most prominent transformation of the concept of security. The state is 
no longer considered the guarantor of security to its people, and is now viewed as a 
possible security threat, most notably in developing countries (McCormack, 2005: 3). 
During the 21st century, the challenges that security poses to states have also become 
more complex. This is visible in how poverty and conflict in developing countries have 
been defined as important issues of international security and how the emphasis has 
shifted from state to human security (Human Security Now, 2003: 2).  
 
According to the influential 1994 United Nations Human Development Report1, in which 
the broad concept of human security was first articulated, human security consists of two 
main elements. Firstly, it refers to safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease and 
repression. Secondly, human security refers to protection from sudden and hurtful 
disruptions in the patterns of daily life (UNDP Development Report, 1994: 23, 24). The 
following definition from the Human Security Now (2003: 4) report will be used: 
 
“Human security is to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhances 
human freedoms and human fulfilment” 
 
The challenges that human security has brought forth have had a large impact on how 
states conduct their foreign policies. This is due to the fact that foreign aid and 
peacekeeping assistance can be considered as diplomatic tools used toward developing 
countries, as well as the means to pursue economic interests. Human security, and 
                                                 
1 According to several authors (e.g McCormack, 2005; Paris, 2001 and Thomas, 1999) the UNDP report of 
1994 initiated the intellectual interest in the concept of human security. 
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especially foreign aid or Official Development Assistance (ODA) influence countries’ 
foreign policies. This is either with reference to how a developing country is affected by 
poverty and conflict as in the case of many African states, or whether a developed 
country such as Japan is in the position to provide assistance to improve the human 
security of the population of a country (or in the case of this study, a continent). Given 
this, the broad research question of this study is in what ways has human security, both as 
a concept and principle, influenced Japan’s foreign policy towards Africa since 1998? 
 
The accelerating forces of globalisation2, which have made borders more porous to the 
movement of humans and goods, have brought forth new challenges, particularly as far as 
human security issues are concerned. These challenges include people facing for example 
economic and political insecurities with much greater intensity. Although affecting all 
countries, developing countries such as South Africa experience these challenges with 
much greater intensity. Globalisation has also had an immense impact on how countries 
conduct their foreign relations, since they have to respond to the changing nature of 
international relations and security parameters in a new security paradigm which has 
impacted decision making. The foreign policy of one country towards another or region is 
also an expression of the needs and self-interest of the country, and how a country wants 
to achieve political or economic goals. The following statement by Thomas (1999: 1) 
summarises this problem involving globalisation, human security and development 
appropriately: 
 
“In the current context of globalization, the inter-connections between the evolving 
global economy, the state as intermediary and the human experience of security are 
important. The relationship between development and human security is central.” 
 
In comparison to Japan’s relationship with other world regions, the political relationship 
between Africa, especially South Africa and Japan is relatively young. It gained new-
found significance with the end of Apartheid and the increase in South - East political 
                                                 
2 Although globalisation is not discussed in detail in this study, it is necessary to put it in the context of 
human security and development since globalisation is a phenomenon that constantly influences the 
international political economy. 
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economic ties and initiatives focusing on development, for example TICAD. As Japan’s 
economic power increased and the range of its political concerns widened, Japan’s 
relationship with Africa gained new value (Kazuo, 2003: 58). The nature of the 
relationship between Japan and Africa has been primarily centered on development and 
aid programs such as ODA and the Tokyo International Conference for African 
Development (TICAD) (2003: 60). Japan is currently the third largest provider of ODA 
in the world, since it slipped from second place in 2006, only five years after being 
replaced by the US as the world’s largest aid donor (Masaki, 2007). Problems such as 
internal wars, poverty and uprisings (which are usually considered as “African 
problems”) have been exacerbated by the progressive globalisation of the world’s 
economy and the end of the Cold War. Issues concerning human security have thus been 
exceptionally significant in Japan’s relations with Africa, since Japan has used South 
Africa as an instrument to achieve better human security on the continent as well as on its 
own home front (Kazuo, 2003: 60). 
 
Thus far in the field of international relations, our knowledge of the influence that the 
concept of human security has on the foreign policies of countries is limited. This is 
partly due to the fact that it is still a relatively new concept and is considered as 
ambiguous. Many studies also only focus on the different components of a country’s 
foreign policy in terms of human security, and the various aspects that address problems 
related to human insecurity. 
 
1.2 Research objectives and goals 
 
This study firstly aims to explain how the concept of human security has influenced 
Japan’s foreign policy towards Africa. Although there are various elements of human 
security present in Japan’s foreign policy, this study will specifically focus on Japanese 
ODA and peacekeeping in Africa. An important research goal is to establish what 
influence Japanese ODA has had on promoting human security on the African continent, 
and to evaluate the goals and ambitions of TICAD since the first conference was held in 
1993. In terms of Japanese peacekeeping in African countries, this study also aims to 
 3
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
establish the significance of human security goals in Japan’s foreign policy, and how this 
has influenced peacekeeping missions to Africa. In conjunction with this, an important 
aim is to analyse how Japan has adjusted to its new security role, because of the pacifist 
nature of its security policies in the past. A next important aim is to investigate how 
human security as a political principle and goal of Japan’s foreign policy has affected the 
relations between itself and Africa, and special attention will also be given to South 
Africa.  
 
An integral part of Japan’s ODA is for peacekeeping and peacebuilding in conflict ridden 
countries such as Sudan, for which Japan granted a significant amount of aid in March 
2007 for conflict prevention (UNDP, 2007). A chapter is devoted to Japanese 
peacekeeping assistance in Africa, since it can be considered a key method of promoting 
the principles of human security. Proof that Japan has been an advocate of human 
security and that it is a vital part of its foreign policy can also be found in Japan’s official 
Diplomatic Bluebook of 2006. It states that “Japan promotes diplomacy with an emphasis 
on the perspective of ‘human security’” (Diplomatic Bluebook, 2006: 183). 
 
1.3 Literature review 
 
Human Security 
 
The literature on human security has grown considerably since the UNDP published the 
Human Development Report in 1994. This report included the various components that 
human security consists of, for example political and economic components. Although 
important in promoting further debate on human security, this report lacked a concrete 
working definition for human security. Tuchman Mathews (1989) sensed the need for 
redefining security in a post-Cold war era of politics, and argued that global 
developments require a broader definition of national security to include resource, 
environmental and demographic issues. Paris (2001) followed a more critical approach 
towards the conceptualisation of human security as a fixed definition and a paradigm 
shift in national security. He argued that human security needs to be redefined in order to 
 4
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be useful in research and policymaking, since scholars and analysts are not able to find 
consensus on exactly what human security entails.  
 
The most complete recent document on the issue of human security is the Human 
Security Now report (2003) issued by the United Nations Commission on Human 
Security. This report addressed the most prominent human security issues such as 
poverty, disease and violent conflict which are relevant in the context of African 
development. In this report many African case studies are also presented. The argument 
of this report is that immediate actions need to be taken in order to promote human 
security across the globe in developing countries, where people are facing severe 
insecurities in their daily lives. Muloongo, Kibasomba and Kariri (2005) provide case 
studies of seven countries in Southern Africa in which human security issues such as 
violent conflict and poverty have a tremendous negative impact on the development of 
these seven Southern African states. A point of departure of this book is that human 
security is gathering momentum as a new measure of global security. The key argument 
is that in the context of the seven different case studies, human insecurity takes on many 
forms and influences countries in different ways. Thomas and Wilkins (1999) provide a 
useful introduction to the concept of human security and its role in the global economy as 
well as the challenges that globalisation brings to developing countries. They argue that 
security should be explored from a human perspective. The theoretical framework that 
this book is based upon is the Human Security Approach. It also analyses the meaning of 
human security in the African context by referring to African states such as Sierra Leone 
and Rwanda. Although not from neo-Realist perspective, in the Southern African context 
Solomon (1996, 2003) has contributed to the literature on human security with the 
emphasis on poverty and conflict.  
 
Japan-Africa Relations 
 
Since South Africa’s democratisation in 1994, as well as the decolonisation of the last 
dependent African states such as Namibia, the international community was forced to 
restructure their foreign policies towards Africa. This was done in order to improve 
 5
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political and diplomatic ties and to pursue economic interests. This has given rise to a 
significant growth in literature on Japan’s foreign policy towards Africa. In the 
contribution of Morikawa (1997) a useful background is provided on the nature of 
Japan’s foreign policy towards Africa, and also sheds some light on its diplomatic 
relations with South Africa. The main arguments of this book on the relations between 
Japan and Africa, is that Japan’s foreign policy serves its economic interests in Africa, 
since it was the largest ODA donor on the continent for a number of years.  
 
Sono (1993) provided a historical background on the ties between Japan and Africa. The 
book examines the nature of African - Japanese contacts from the mid-16th century until 
1993 with the focus on trade, aid, and diplomacy. Ampiah (1997) focused specifically on 
Japan’s relations with South Africa as well as investment and aid to countries such as 
Nigeria and Tanzania. The book is an empirical analysis of the political, economic and 
diplomatic factors influencing Japan’s relations with African countries. An important 
argument of this book is that Japan has used South Africa as a strategic diplomatic tool to 
broaden its economic horizons in Africa. Alden and Hirano (2003) have contributed to 
the more recent literature on the economic and political relations between South Africa 
and Japan, and what implications these hold for their respective regions. The book also 
illustrates the challenges facing the partnership between Japan and Africa, and the 
influence of ODA and investment in Africa. However, there is no mention of human 
security and very little on issues concerning development, which is a fundamental part of 
Japan’s foreign policy towards Africa, and more specifically South Africa.  
 
The present study can contribute to an understudied aspect of the relations between Japan 
and Africa, by assessing the influence of human security on Japan’s foreign policy 
towards Africa. 
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1.4 Theoretical Framework: Realism in international relations and the Human 
Security Approach 
 
Within international relations (IR), the concept of human security has mostly been 
developed from the vantage of two main theoretical perspectives. The first is an approach 
based on a Neo-Realist framework as in the work of Barry Buzan, which maintains an 
emphasis on the primacy of the state within a broadened conceptualisation of human 
security. It is often referred to as the “new security thinking”. The critical Human 
Security Approach as in the work of Ken Booth (1994) which is rooted within the 
pluralist theory of international politics represents the other end in this discourse. This 
approach is based on a set of assumptions that attempt to dislodge the state as the primary 
referent of security, and places more emphasis on non-state actors (Naidoo, 2001). Booth 
also argues that redefining security requires that the concept should be broadened both 
“horizontally and vertically” (Solomon & Cilliers, 1996). In order to be able to discuss 
the complete security discourse, both Realism and the Human Security Approach have 
been selected for this study. Both theoretical approaches have been selected to provide a 
more complete discussion on the new security debate. Firstly an overview of the most 
important contending theoretical frameworks in IR is necessary.  
 
Two main theoretical perspectives in IR that challenge Realism, are Liberalism and 
Marxism. Liberalism is also sometimes referred to as Idealism. Whereas Realists are 
sceptical about human nature, and therefore believe conflict is inevitable, Liberalists in 
contrast believe that people by nature tend to strive for improvement and continuous 
learning. In short, Liberalists believe in the progressive nature of humans, therefore strive 
for perfection and thus live in harmony with one another. Liberalists do not rely on the 
breakdown of the balance of power when interpreting international conflict (Nel, 2006: 
31-34). 
 
A second contending perspective is Marxism, an influential school of thought initiated by 
Karl Marx, a German political economist in the nineteenth century. Marxists agrees with 
Realists that the structure of the international system is a relevant factor to consider in 
 7
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order to understand IR. A second important distinction is that Marxists also consider 
power as an important factor in international affairs. Nevertheless, Marxists place the 
emphasis on the unequal distribution of wealth. Thirdly, Marxists also share the Realist 
critical attitude towards the role of morality in the international system. Marxists view 
morality as an ideological excuse that actors use to hide their economic interests. 
Marxists, do, however hold the assumption that the capitalist world is an unjust place, 
and that transformations should take place. A fourth characteristic of the Marxist school 
of thought is that it rejects the Realist preoccupation with the state. Actors are viewed in 
terms of unequal class structures in society that are exploitive and oppressive towards the 
poor. The last assumption that the Marxist perspective is based on, lies between the 
Realist and Liberalist assumptions on the continuity of IR. Like the Realists, Marxists 
believe continuity does exist. However, for Marxists this continuity lies in the fact that 
throughout the course of history, certain groups or classes in society controlled 
production, and this led to them being privileged (Nel, 2006: 42-43). 
 
Realism has been selected to better comprehend the complex foreign policies and 
relations between Japan and Africa. Although there are many versions of Realism in IR, 
they all share the following basic characteristics: firstly, the main actors in Realism are 
states who want to secure their own survival and security. Secondly, the nature of the 
system in which states find themselves are anarchical, thus there is no central government 
that can control states. Thirdly, the ‘power security’ principle is the leading mode of 
interaction. Fourthly, although for some states defensive security is a primary goal, other 
states will become predators and force concessions from a weaker power. Lastly, internal 
politics and external politics are considered to be separate (Nicholson, 1998: 67, 68). 
 
There is general consensus that the work of Kenneth Waltz has been the most influential 
work in the Neo-Realism spectrum. He introduced the notion of the ‘structure of the 
international system’. This is based on the assumption that states’ desire for security is 
bound by the anarchic structure of the international system (Brown & Ainly, 2005: 44, 
45). Structural Realism which was originally developed by Waltz and further developed 
by Barry Buzan, Richard Little and Charles Jones, who are all respected authors in IR. 
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 According to Buzan et al (1993: 10-13) there are three important elements that signifies 
Structural Realism as an extension of the Realist tradition. Firstly, there is a continued 
insistence on the dominance of the political sphere. Secondly, the state is still considered 
as the most important actor in the international system. It must be emphasised that this 
does not close the theory to other units or actors, which is important for the context of 
this study. Other actors, for example, organisations such as the UN are also considered 
important. Lastly, the close linkage between units and structure not only defines the 
continuity between Structural Realism and the traditional Realist assumptions, but opens 
the way to a much more multisectoral system than that offered by Neorealism. Buzan 
also argues that the militaristic approach to security that dominated the security discourse 
during the Cold War was ‘simple minded’ and led to the underdevelopment of the 
concept. Buzan includes political, economic and social perspectives of the international 
system, the state and the individual. Buzan’s analysis provides the most extensive 
contemporary examination of human security from a state-combined perspective 
(Naidoo, 2001).  
 
In order to gain a better understanding of human security in the African continent and 
how this has influenced Japan’s foreign policy towards Africa, the Human Security 
Approach has also been selected. It involves a fundamental departure from the orthodox 
security analysis, in which the state is the primary object (Thomas, 1999: 1, 2). The 
primary focus of the Human Security Approach is human beings. This approach has two 
strands: firstly, it makes the argument that since the end of the Cold War there has been a 
range of different security threats, which cannot be dealt with militarily by sovereign 
states. Secondly, it involves a normative argument which suggests that the end of 
superpower conflict has allowed the international community and states to adjust their 
policies in order to ensure a better life for the individual. The Human Security Approach 
also redefines the relationship between the state and its citizens. Sovereignty is redefined 
from the inherent right of a state, since it is something that is granted by the international 
community on behalf of the citizens of that state (McCormack, 2005: 4, 16). An 
important argument of the Human Security Approach is that the security discourse must 
 9
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
be understood as part of the capitalist global economy as well as associated global 
structures. This is because it has an immensely important impact on how states conduct 
their foreign policies, since human security threats come from the global political 
economy, and must thus be addressed therein as well (Thomas, 1999: 1, 2). States are 
mainly viewed in as the problem in terms of not providing sufficient human security to its 
citizens. Nevertheless, states are the primary actors who are able to improve human 
security within its borders. The reason why both The Human Security Approach and 
Realism will be used in this study is to have a more balanced theoretical framework since 
each has its strengths and shortcomings. 
 
1.5 Conceptualisations 
 
1.5.1 Human Security  
 
The concept of human security is relatively new and is characterised by its ambiguity. No 
fixed definition exists. The first influential conceptualisation of human security was 
published in the 1994 UNDP Human Development Report, an annual publication of the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (Paris, 2001: 89).  
 
Human security can be understood as a state of existence, in which the primary material 
needs are met, and therefore meaningful contribution and participation in social life and 
communities can be realised. However, human security cannot solely be understood as 
meeting just physical needs. Freedom from predatory power structures, whether they are 
global, national or local is also essential for human security (Thomas, 1999: 3). Mlambo 
(2005: 230) also argues that state security is no longer adequate to ensure human security 
and development. Thus, instead of focusing on the relations between states to obtain 
security, human security rather refers to the daily struggles that people have to face which 
include crime, health problems and income insecurity (Thomas, 1999: 5). The 1994 
UNDP Report identified the following components of human security: economic 
security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, 
community security and political security (UNDP, 1994: 24, 25). 
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This definition has been qualified by The United Nations Commission on Human 
Security which argues that human security refers to more than the mere absence of 
violent conflict. It also includes human rights, access to education, health care, good 
governance, and lastly that people must be able to fulfil their own potential (Human 
Security Now, 2003: 4). Since the influence of the concept human security on Japan’s 
foreign policy is the research problem of this study, it is relevant to mention the Japanese 
government’s official definition: “The concept of human security comprehensively 
covers all the measures that threaten human survival, daily life and dignity” (Paris, 2001: 
90). 
 
1.5.2 Globalisation 
 
Although globalisation is not a key variable in this study, it is important to conceptualise 
the term since it is important in the context of human security and reference to it will be 
made in the course of this study. In modern politics, the term ‘globalisation’ is without a 
doubt one of the most contested concepts: from when it started, and exactly what it 
entails. Thus, the need exists for the conceptualisation of globalisation in the context of 
foreign policy and human security. The following definition by Mittelman (1996: 3) has 
been selected for this study: 
 
“A worldwide phenomenon, globalization is a coalescence of varied transnational 
processes and domestic structures, allowing the economy, politics, culture and ideology 
of one country to penetrate another.” 
 
This definition can be qualified by Jan Aart Scholte (2005: 59) who argues that we need 
to view globalisation as a transplanetary shift of space, and that there are supraterritorial 
links between people across the globe. Thus, territoriality has lost some significance, for 
example the borders of states. This in part means that pandemics such as HIV/AIDS can 
spread easier as well as conflict from one state to another. Scholte (2005: 84) also 
highlights in his book that many people confuse the concept of globalisation with the 
definitions of internationalization, universalization, westernization and lastly 
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liberalization. Although globalisation is related with these concepts, it does not have the 
exact same meaning since globalisation is firstly a much more modern concept which 
owes its meaning to “globalism”. Although globalisation cannot be solely blamed for the 
increase in human insecurity, it most definitely has a negative impact on issues such as 
poverty, health and political instability (2005: 279). 
 
1.6 Methodology 
 
The nature of this study is mainly exploratory and qualitative, and is based on primary 
and secondary sources of information. Research questions that are descriptive and 
evaluative, are central to a qualitative paradigm, accompanied by inductive reasoning 
(Mouton, 2006: 162). However, in some parts of this study a quantitative analysis is 
done, for example data on the size and direction of Japan’s ODA disbursements and the 
type of projects ODA is disbursed for toward peacebuilding in African countries. A mix 
of qualitative and quantitative methods aids this study in being more complete, since each 
paradigm has a contribution to make in the security debate. 
 
Whilst secondary sources are mainly used and analysed, primary sources such as official 
diplomatic publications of the Japanese government, as well as speeches of the ministry 
of foreign affairs (MOFA) have been analysed. Secondary sources mainly consist of 
academic journal articles, publications, books, media reports and statistics derived from 
studies conducted by respected authors in the field of IR.  
 
1.7 Limitations and delimitations of study 
 
First important limitations are time and space, since this study has to be completed within 
a certain time span and it is limited to a certain length. This research project is also 
limited since not all aspects of human security can be covered in the scope of this study 
within different political and economic contexts, for example all countries within the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC). Another important limitation is the 
fact that only Japan’s foreign policy to Africa will be analysed in terms of how human 
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security has influenced it. A further limitation is that not all African states that receive 
ODA from Japan can be discussed. Since the concept of human security is relatively new, 
the literature on the subject is relatively limited, in comparison to other areas of studies in 
IR, where a fuller body of knowledge exists. A further important limitation is the fact that 
some literature is only available in Japanese and not English, which is the primary 
language in which this study is conducted.  
 
In terms of delimitations, the analytical component of this study will only focus on 
Japan’s foreign policy on human security since 1998 until recently, since the concept was 
only then recognised by the MOFA. The focus of the study will also solely be on Japan’s 
foreign policy, and will not include a discussion of other influential Asian countries, for 
example, China which is a major political and economic role player in Africa.  
 
1.8 Outline of remaining chapters 
 
The remaining part of this study is divided into four chapters. Chapter 2 examines the 
history of Japan’s Africa relations. Japan’s position in international politics after the Cold 
War is also discussed. Special attention is given to the influence of the decolonisation of 
African states in Japan’s involvement in Africa, as well as the end of Apartheid in South 
Africa, since this marked the beginning of an important political and economic 
relationship these two countries. The main focus of this chapter is to highlight the most 
relevant political and economic aspects of the earlier relations between Japan and Africa. 
 
Chapter 3 deals with Japanese ODA to Africa and the influence of human security on 
Japan’s foreign policy in this context. In this chapter the nature and structure of ODA is 
discussed in detail. An important element of this chapter is to outline the TICAD 
initiative, its goals in terms of promoting security and development and whether it has 
reached these objectives since it was launched in 1993. Lastly, Japan’s involvement in 
multilateral initiatives such as the New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD) and the UNDP is discussed in order to evaluate the role that Japan plays to 
promote African development in multilateral forums. 
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 Chapter 4 analyses Japan’s involvement in peacekeeping missions in conflict ridden 
African countries. The nature of Japan’s foreign policies in terms of peacekeeping 
missions will be discussed, and how Japan has regulated its foreign policy on security 
issues since the end of the Cold War.  
 
Chapter 5 provides the conclusion, where the key findings of the study are discussed and 
outlined. The implications of these finding for both Japan and Africa will also be 
discussed in order to draw conclusions on the influence of human security on Japan’s 
foreign policy towards Africa and the prognosis. Recommendations for future research on 
human security, ODA and peacebuilding are also made. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 14
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 2: JAPAN’S RELATIONS WITH AFRICA AND SOUTH 
AFRICA: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
According to several scholars (e.g. Ampiah, 1997; Adem, 2001; Morikawa, 1997; Sono, 
1993 and Alden & Hirano, 2003), historically there was little interaction between Japan 
and Africa. However, Aircardi de Saint Paul (2002) argues that Japanese and African 
relations date back to 1510 when the Portuguese first introduced black slaves in Japan. 
Japan has only emerged since the 1960s as an important trading partner and it became a 
relevant player in African political affairs during the 1980s (Morikawa, 1997: 1).The 
significant shift of the security debate after the end of the Cold War from state to human 
security also had an immense effect on Japan’s foreign policy towards developing 
countries, since the end of the Cold War brought with it a new kind of war – the plight of 
civilians in developing countries. Thus, Japan later sought to provide ODA to poor 
African countries in exchange for access to their markets (Edström, 2003: 209).  
 
The end of the Cold War is not the only important contributing factor leading to an 
increase in political and economic relations between Japan and Africa. In this chapter an 
overview of the influence of the decolonisation of African states on Japan’s foreign 
policy towards Africa, as well as the significance of the end of Apartheid in terms of 
relations between Japan and South Africa will be discussed. A brief overview of the 
much earlier ties between Japan and Africa in terms of diplomatic and economic relations 
is also provided in order to understand the context of the development of these relations. 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a background for the following chapters on Japanese 
ODA and peacekeeping in Africa, and towards the end of this study to explain how this 
relates back to the importance of human security in Japan’s foreign policy. 
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2.2 First contacts and Japan’s earlier ties with Africa: an overview 
 
2.2.1 Political and diplomatic relations 
 
Historical interaction between the Japanese and the African continent is a unique 
phenomenon that originated in the 1500s when slaves from Africa were carried by ship to 
Nagasaki. Between 1547 and 1885, Japanese and Africans were experiencing contacts of 
extraordinary dimensions since trade increased because of the dramatic increase in 
maritime expeditions. These relations continued for approximately 100 years, but the 
anti-Christian and anti-Western attitude of the shoguns led to a decrease in the number of 
foreigners. From 1868 to 1912, which is known as the Meiji era, slaves of African origin 
were brought back to Africa by North American vessels (Sono, 1993: 14). 
 
The Japanese set foot on the African continent only in 1586, during their maritime 
journeys towards Europe. According to Aicardi de Saint Paul (2002) it was only from the 
17th century that truly significant relations developed between the Empire of the Rising 
Sun, and the “Distant Continent”. Jan van Riebeeck, the founder of the Cape of Good 
Hope in 1652, was based in Nagasaki under the flag of the Dutch East India Company 
and was Japan’s partner in Africa. Since the Cape of Good Hope became a regular stop-
over for the Japanese whilst sailing to Europe or South America, the African continent 
became a unique destination for Japanese traders (Aicardi de Saint Paul, 2002). 
 
Japan’s more recent Africa policy resides in its political economy of growth and 
economic recovery in the post-war period after World War II. Although Japan only 
regained its independence in 1952, its post-war Africa diplomacy dates back to 
September 1951, when it signed a peace treaty with the Allied Nations of the Western 
bloc. These states included South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Liberia. A security treaty 
was also concluded with the United States (US) (Morikawa, 1997: 52). The Yoshida 
Doctrine, named after the former Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, opened the door for 
Japan’s economic development and the start of its economic diplomacy (Alden, 2002: 
366). Japan’s relations with Africa followed the pattern of changes of the hegemonic 
powers, first Britain and then the US’s power shift in global politics (Ampiah, 1997: 34).  
 
 16
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Japan’s diplomacy was formally declared by its foreign office in 1957. Japan’s main 
diplomatic goals were to promote its prosperity, to ensure the country’s security and to 
become the world’s leading economic power. In Japan’s 1957 Blue Paper, later called the 
Diplomatic Bluebook, the Japanese government declared the following basic principles of 
its diplomacy which formed the core of Japan’s global diplomatic pacifism and 
international cooperation: 
 
i) adherence to the principles of the United Nations; 
ii) close cooperation with the Western countries (especially the US); and 
iii) solidarity with the Afro-Asian nations. 
 (Sono, 1993: 108) 
 
As Japan’s economic power grew and its political concerns widened, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MOFA) came to grasp the importance of its diplomatic relations with 
Africa, especially Sub-Saharan Africa. Japan also realised the power and importance of 
the UN in a post-war international arena, and that African votes carried a significant 
weight in the UN (Kazuo, 2003: 58). However, it is important to note that Japan was 
never formally involved in the search for African colonies, only for raw materials. A 
significant historical weakness of Africa-Japan diplomatic ties has been the absence of a 
broad framework for Tokyo and Africa within which they could conduct diplomatic 
relations (Sono, 1993: 14, 127). Thus, it can be argued that Japan’s earlier ties with 
Africa were much more based on economic interests than any political gains or influence 
on the continent. 
 
2.2.2 Economic ties: imports and exports 
 
The inter-war period in Africa was a time when Japan attempted to take a niche for itself 
from a region where it was politically excluded from, but one which was increasingly 
becoming a lifeline for the country’s weakened economy. In the 1930s, the term 
“economic diplomacy” was first used within government documents and the Japanese 
media to describe the process by which Japan wanted to gain greater access to European 
dominated markets in Africa (Kitagawa, 2003: 39). 
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 Prior to the 1960s, Japan’s trade relationship with Africa was extremely limited because 
of distance, lack of historical ties and a perceived cultural gap. When trade between Japan 
and South Africa commenced, Japan’s exports consisted mainly of textiles, especially 
silk and cotton fabrics. It later evolved to diversified products such as buttons, potteries 
and porcelains. One of the main contributing factors that led to an increase in trade 
between Japan and Africa was when the Japanese government established the Yawatu 
Iron and Steel Works, which began production in 1901. Although it was at first 
established for military purposes, the Yatawu in time played a significant role in Africa. 
Two years after the establishment of the company, trade between Africa and Japan 
dramatically increased: the first decade of the 18th century saw Japanese imports from 
Africa increase with 26,8% and the country’s exports to Africa for the same period 
increased with 33%. Although these facts are important, Japan’s contact with Africa was 
still limited in the context of international trade, because Africa was under European rule 
(Sono, 1993:80). 
 
Japan’s imports from Africa began moderately with raw essential materials such as 
cotton, cotton seed and wool, but by 1930, imports diversified and products such as 
caustic soda and soda ash were also imported. Most of the trade before the 1960s was 
textiles that were exported to “Black Africa”, thus Southern Africa was not considered as 
important. During the 1960s there was more involvement because of yen loans to 
countries in West and East Africa (Sharp, 2003:103).  
 
During the 1960s Japan faced two problems in its attempts to promote exports to “Black 
Africa”. The first was the serious trade imbalance in its own favour with its main African 
trading partners, Nigeria and Kenya. The second hurdle was the application of Article 35 
of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) that imposed tariffs on Japanese 
goods in “Black Africa” and in particular in the Francophone countries. The only country 
in which Japan did not encounter trade problems was in Zambia because of the massive 
importation of copper from the country. However, elsewhere in Africa the trade 
imbalance was a serious issue. As a result, Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda imposed tough 
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import restrictions on Japanese goods (Morikawa, 1997: 64, 65). Nevertheless, it was not 
until the 1970s, particularly with the 1973 oil crisis that Japan’s interest in Africa, in 
particular Southern Africa began to develop. This was mainly due to Japan lacking 
energy resources (Alden, 2002: 367). 
 
Since Japan was South Africa’s leading trading partner in Africa for numerous years, 
especially during Apartheid, it is necessary to provide a brief overview of the trade 
relationship between the two countries. This relationship was plagued with difficulties, as 
will be explained in a later section. Nevertheless, both countries realised that the other 
presented an economic lifeline: Japan desperately needed South Africa’s raw materials 
and South Africa required a market to export to because of the numerous economic 
sanctions against the country as well as its international isolation due to its Apartheid 
policies. The two way trade between the two countries was worth US$ 762.9 million in 
1972, by 1979 it reached US$ 2.3 billion. By 1980, it had grown to US$ 3.5 billion. At 
this stage, Japan was South Africa’s fourth largest trading partner after the US, Britain 
and Germany, and in 1981 it was already South Africa’s second largest trading partner. In 
1987 Japan emerged as South Africa’s leading trading partner, and also faced the 
difficulty of the sanctions debate (Ampiah, 1997: 67, 68).   
 
2.3 Influence of African decolonisation on Japan’s foreign policy towards Africa 
 
The fact that Japan was occupied by the Allied Forces from the end of World War II until 
the end of the 1950s resulted in Japan being heavily influenced by US policies on African 
decolonisation. The US was against the struggle of Africans against European colonial 
powers. Japan only regained its own independence from the Allied Forces in 1952 
(Ampiah, 1997: 44). Before World War II, only Egypt, Ethiopia and Liberia were 
independent states in Africa. At the end of World War II in 1945, colonial powers in 
Africa also regarded African independence only in the very distant future. Japan 
however, was content to simply reconstruct its war-damaged economy upon the natural 
resource base of Africa (Sono, 1993: 94, 95, 115). Japan’s attitude towards the process of 
decolonisation in Africa has to be understood within the earlier US-African foreign 
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policy framework, because of the Asian country’s close relationship with the US. 
However, from 1960 onwards, when a mutual security treaty was obtained with the US, it 
became less constrained in its foreign policy in terms of the decolonisation in Africa 
(Ampiah, 1997: 44). Of all the independent African states Japan only recognised Ethiopia 
in 1955 as an independent state. The Ethiopian president at that stage, Haile Selassie was 
also the first African head of state to make an official tour of Japan (Sono, 1993: 115-
117). In November 1952, Tokyo opened its first consulate generals in South Africa as 
well as the former Rhodesia (Morikawa, 1997: 52, 53).  
 
Japan’s relationship with Africa as a whole, especially during Apartheid, is characterised 
by its duality in terms of a “White Africa” and “Black Africa” policy. Japan’s privileged 
relations with “White Africa” resulted in Japan mainly doing business with Rhodesia as 
well as the Apartheid government (Aicardi de Saint Paul, 2002). The period from 1975 
until 1989 can be considered as the time when Japan focused most of its attention in 
Africa on the white minority regimes and supported it, although Japan’s “Black Africa” 
policy was consolidated and advanced simultaneously. The first important objective of 
the “White Africa” policy was to show support for the white minority regimes. The 
second goal was to secure a constant supply of rare metals such as chrome and platinum. 
Lastly, an important goal was to maintain and expand export markets (Morikawa, 1997: 
11, 12, 69, 70). 
 
Between 1960 and 1975, the Japanese government formulated the organisation of its 
African diplomacy while establishing diplomatic relations with the newly-born states of 
“Black Africa”. The goals of Japan’s “Black Africa” policy present a stark contrast to 
those of the “White Africa” policy. Firstly, Japan wanted to establish and promote 
friendly and cooperative relations with pro-Western countries as well as non-aligned 
nations and forces. A second goal was to maintain a policy of confrontation and dialogue 
with countries generally regarded as pro-Eastern. Lastly, Japan wanted to secure natural 
resources such as copper, iron and uranium (Morikawa, 1997: 62, 63).   
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In terms of the “Black Africa” policy, Japan sought for political and economic reasons to 
improve and strengthen its relations with the independent black African countries, for 
example Angola and Mozambique. Japan’s “diplomacy of resources” was aimed at 
assuring the second world economy with a regular supply of raw materials (Aicardi de 
Saint Paul, 2002). Japan also applied the approach of ODA to countries it wanted to trade 
with in “Black Africa”, as it also did with Latin America and other Asian countries. 
Providing ODA was a joint approach in which Japanese industries would provide direct 
investment and related technology and help with natural resources development projects 
(Morikawa, 1997: 70). Japanese ODA will be discussed in detail in the following chapter. 
 
Without a doubt, Japan’s entry into the UN in 1956 also played a very important role in 
its autonomy. However, policy makers in Japan were not truly aware and sensitive to the 
new developments in Africa. For example, at the independence celebrations of Ghana in 
1956, which was the first sub-Saharan state to be liberated from colonial rule in the post-
war period, Japan was only represented by its Ambassador to Ghana. Japan’s 
conservative leaders supported self-determination in principle although they also made 
their loathing clear of the application of revolutionary means to achieve it. It is important 
to mention that Japan had to prevent political chaos on the African continent since it 
would prohibit the flow of resources from Africa to Japan. It is therefore no surprise that 
the report of the ‘Heiwa modai kenkyŭkai’ on Japan’s comprehensive national security 
expressed concern on the political and racial problems in Southern Africa (Ampiah, 
1997: 45, 46). 
 
By the early 1960s Japan’s economic interests started dictating the pace of its foreign 
policy objectives. Japan also substituted economics for politics as the determining factor 
of its foreign relations. By the late 1970s Japan assumed a pro-African position: however, 
it still did not commit itself to the complex political economy of the African landscape 
(Ampiah, 1997: 50). Japan had re-established diplomatic relations with countries that 
controlled the “White Triangle” area of Africa before 1960, specifically focusing on 
South Africa as a strategic partner. Japan also increased commercial relations with the 
continent by privileging English-speaking states. During the struggle for independence of 
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Portuguese colonies such as Angola, Japan was insensitive to the demands of nationalists. 
Aware of this mistake, Japanese authorities were later the first to recognise the 
independence of Angola (Aicardi de Saint Paul, 2002). Nonetheless, Japan ultimately 
failed to contribute significant material and moral support for the liberation of the African 
people under colonial rule. This is partly due to the fact that the country tended to 
sympathise with the colonialists when Africa and many Asian countries were denouncing 
colonialism in the southern cone of the continent (Sono, 1993: 124).  
 
The time span between 1960 and 1975 witnessed the Japanese government formulating 
the organisation of its African diplomacy whilst establishing diplomatic relations and 
expanding economic relations with new states on the continent. From 1975 until 1989 
Japan’s main objective in terms of its African foreign policy was to improve diplomatic 
relations and to soften African criticisms of Japan. Japan adopted the following tactics: 
firstly, it showed more sympathy towards African national liberation movements and also 
showed more interest in African international politics in general. Secondly, it aimed to 
improve its ‘African image’ by providing African countries with aid for development and 
emergency relief (Morikawa, 1997: 63, 81, 82, 83). 
 
The beginning of the Cold War ushered a new concept of spheres of influence, as was 
directed by the ideological positions of the US on the one hand and Moscow on the other. 
Both superpowers saw the end of colonialism in Africa as crucial to their economic, 
political and strategic decisions (Ampiah, 1997: 37). During the colonial period, Japan 
took advantage of the situation to develop its relations with Africa, since it used Africa as 
a tool to promote its comeback to the international scene after its own independence. The 
process of Africa’s balkanisation into about fifty states, most of which were part of the 
General Assembly of the UN was carried political significance for Japan: this was an 
opportunity for Japan to fulfil its Security Council ambitions (Aicardi de Saint Paul, 
2002). Japan also began to support some African resolutions in the UN even if the 
country tended to abstain more often than casting votes in support. Virtually all the 
resolutions were pacifist of nature and intent but focused on African criticism of 
colonialism, racism and South African Apartheid. As African unity grew, Japan gradually 
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and systematically began to vote with the Africans in the UN. Many critics dismiss this 
support as Japan doing anything in its power to obtain the following: a seat on the 
Security Council and access to Africa’s natural resources (Sono, 1993: 121). 
 
Japan’s security policy, as defined within its constitution and the framework of the US-
Japan Security Treaty, proved to be static when confronted with the most serious crisis to 
have come from the decolonisation process in sub-Saharan Africa: the crisis in the Congo 
in 1960 brought Japan’s security policy and its policy towards political problems into 
serious question. On the issue of whether Japan should contribute to UN forces in the 
Congo, Japanese policymakers argued that Article IX of the constitution prohibited it to 
deploy armed forces. However, as more countries became independent, momentum was 
gained for action against colonial rule in Africa (Ampiah, 1997: 44-48). 
  
2.4 Japan in a post-Cold War era of international relations 
 
The year 1989, is not only significant since it is the year the Cold War ended officially, it 
also marks the date that Japan achieved the status as the world’s leading ODA donor. 
This was the country’s grande entrance back into the international political arena (Hook 
& Zhang, 1998: 1051). Japan’s commitment was also demonstrated in launching the 
TICAD process in 1993, thus shifting the international community’s attention back to 
Africa in the 1990s after the end of the Cold War shifted global focus elsewhere (UNDP, 
2003).  
 
The two realities that impacted Japan’s foreign policy towards Africa after the Cold War 
the most, was firstly the confrontation between the US and the Union of the Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR) and secondly Apartheid - which will be discussed in more 
detail in the next section. The significance of the US and USSR standoff was that both 
sides purposefully interjected the East-West confrontation into Africa, resulting in many 
of the conflicts that can be seen in the context of the Cold War. Japan was therefore 
unable to detach its foreign policy towards Africa from that frame of reference (Kazuo, 
2003: 57).  
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The developments in world politics from the end of World War II led to two Cold Wars: 
the conflict between the US and USSR on the one hand and the struggle of the Afro-
Asian countries to free themselves from colonial domination (Ampiah, 2003: 23). 
According to Adem (2001), Japan’s post-Cold War Africa policy should be understood as 
a function of the interplay between economic power and asymmetric interdependence on 
the one hand, and culture and diplomacy on the other. Before the end of the Cold War, 
Japan was often attentive to the overall geopolitical implication of its economic and 
political interactions with the Third World. Nevertheless, the end of the Cold War caught 
Japan unprepared for the changes it would bring to international affairs and what its new 
role in it would be (Tsuneo, 2000: 178). 
 
In terms of Japan’s security role in regional and international affairs, it experienced a 
significant shift from that which it used to play during the Cold War when Japan 
followed an isolationist regional approach of one-country pacifism. This particular 
strategy rested on the following two pillars: firstly, Japan pursued its economic 
diplomacy while it avoided a political role in international security affairs. Secondly, 
Japan entrusted its stake in regional security to the US. However, Japan realised it could 
not continue to follow this approach in the post- Cold War era since its passivity to 
security issues came under severe attack (Singh, 2002). Until recently, Japan has failed to 
see its relationship with Russia and other former countries belonging to the Soviet Union 
in a broader and global context, having focused for years on a bilateral territorial dispute 
(Tsuneo, 2000: 178). The end of the Cold War also saw the rise of “soft” security issues 
which includes human security which have initiated a debate over new and old forms of 
security becoming a battle between visionaries and traditionalists.  
 
Japan’s defence policies faced several challenges between the late 1980s and the early 
1990s. Some of the reasons for this include that Western democracies lost their common 
military threat, the Soviet Union. However, the Japanese “bubble” economy came to be 
perceived as a new threat to the Western democracies, especially to the US. When the 
Cold War ended, the American perception of the economic disadvantages in its 
relationship with Japan outweighed the political advantages (Jitsuo, 2000: 146).  
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 In a post-Cold War international political arena, international relations were characterised 
by a multipolar world which replaced the bipolar order. The waning of the Cold War and 
the emergence of Japan as the world’s second largest economy meant that Tokyo had to 
reconsider its role in international politics. In this new multipolar order, because of 
Japan’s newly attained economic strength, it emerged as one of the poles of power 
(Fukushima, 1999: 5). The apparent decline of the US, which also emphasised the 
limitations of militarism over that of economic dominance, led to Japan adopting a new 
international political role to correspond with its economic standing. Multilateralism, 
which was a key feature of Japan’s post-war foreign policy, played an important role in 
shaping the country’s international relations. In this context, Africa occupied a unique 
position for Japan since it was not part of the troublesome legacy politics of war-time 
militarism (Alden, 2003: 9).   
 
2.5 The role of Apartheid in relations between Japan and South Africa 
 
Japan’s relationship with South Africa has been more intimate than with other African 
countries, but also accompanied by much greater obstacles (Cornelissen, 2004: 122). 
Within the framework of Japan’s Africa policy, South Africa has played an important 
role because of the country’s pre-eminence, which was underscored by both countries’ 
close trading relationship and the outsider political relationship during Apartheid (Alden, 
2002: 365). Since both Japan and South Africa have historically and geographically been 
remote, relations between the two countries hardly ever attracted any attention until 
Japan’s trade with the Apartheid regime became prominent enough to encourage 
international condemnation in the 1960s. It was also at this time that South Africa’s 
international isolation which began in the 1940s became increasingly evident (Osada, 
2003: 45). The relationship between Japan and South Africa during and after Apartheid 
can be characterised by Japan’s dependency on South Africa’s mineral resources and 
South Africa’s dependency on Japan which exported heavy industrial products. Thus, 
they can be considered as one another’s most strategic trading partners during Apartheid. 
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The National Party, which was the ruling party during Apartheid, sought to diversify its 
international relations because of the increasing criticism against its racist Apartheid 
policies. For Japan, who supported the West’s struggle against communism, closer 
economic ties with South Africa meant that it was part of the struggle in South Africa 
against communism. By 1979, Japan was dependent on several minerals which it 
imported from South Africa. However, in its relations with South Africa, Japan had to 
follow a foreign policy of the separation of politics and economics, since it condemned 
the practices of the Apartheid regime, yet it still traded on a large scale with the country 
(Ampiah, 1997: 56, 57). Japan most definitely followed a “best of both worlds policy” 
since they were a frontrunner of sanctions against the Apartheid regime since 1985. Japan 
thought that it could claim moral leadership in the anti-Apartheid crusade, although it was 
raking in billions of dollars from South Africa’s natural resources (Sono, 1993: 328).  
 
Because the relationship between South Africa and Japan was deepening, the Apartheid 
government had to alter its racial policies in order to smooth the path for trade with an 
Asian nation. In April 1961, a decree was passed which meant that Japanese had to be 
classified as white. Thus, the Japanese continued trade with South Africa since they 
would be considered as “honorary whites”, although there was widespread criticism 
against South Africa from the Japanese public, who argued that the “honorary white” 
label was extremely racist. Attempts like these to accommodate the Japanese were an 
indication of the importance of foreign trade for South Africa, in particular with Japan. It 
was also an indication of the importance of South Africa to Japanese economic security. 
Thus the two countries complemented each other because of their individual comparative 
advantage in the international system (Ampiah, 1997: 70).  
 
Japan’s trade with South Africa also harmed its Security Council ambitions: Japan nearly 
lost a non-permanent seat on the Council in 1965 because of African nation’s criticism of 
Japan’s trade relations with the Apartheid regime. Since Japan wanted to run for another 
seat on the Security Council in 1969, they needed to demonstrate their tough attitude to 
South Africa in order to secure a seat (Alden, 2003: 46). Japan decided in 1974 that 
diplomatic relations would only be conducted at a consulate level, and that all cultural, 
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sport and educational exchanges to Japan by South Africans were denied as well as 
tourist visas. Nevertheless, business visas were issued to influential stakeholders in 
business and politics. At the same time the volume of Japan’s trade with South Africa 
quadrupled between 1974 and 1987. This meant that Japan was South Africa’s number 
one trading partner, much to the embarrassment of the MOFA (Ampiah, 1997: 56, 57). 
 
When Japan became South Africa’s leading trade partner in 1987, the Japanese 
government was frantic. Many nations shared the perception that Japan was a racist, 
chauvinist state. Because of severe international criticism, especially from the UN and 
US against Japan’s trade relationship with South Africa, meant that becoming the second 
largest trading partner of South Africa in the next two years to alleviate criticism was a 
key goal for Japan. The Japanese government also started to take concrete actions in 
order to demonstrate its anti-Apartheid stance: the government introduced economic 
sanctions, provided bursaries to black university students as well as financial assistance 
to the social upliftment of black people. Several black political leaders and businessmen 
were also invited to Japan (Alden, 2003: 56). Despite the economic ties with South 
Africa, the MOFA officials categorically rejected Apartheid and were led by the 
following diplomatic stance: Japan strongly opposed Apartheid, and was constantly 
exploring views and ways of encouraging peaceful change in South Africa. Lastly, the 
MOFA stated that it would cooperate with other international organisations and countries 
in looking for solutions to put political pressure on the South African government (Sono, 
1993: 329). 
  
During the 1980s there was once again increasing pressure on Japan to minimise its 
dealings with South Africa. In response, the Japanese government prohibited the sale of 
computers to the South African defence and police services. There was also a government 
proposed law that all Japanese companies doing business in South Africa should give 
equal employment opportunities to its employees, irrespective of their race (Ampiah, 
1997: 56, 57). It should be noted that Japan’s trade with South Africa was never 
excessive. It fluctuated only slightly and never exceeded 2% of its total trade. When 
Japan became South Africa’s leading trading partner in 1987, trade with South Africa 
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was only 1,1 % of Japan’s total trade (Alden, 2003: 56). When trade began to fall 
drastically in 1988, it fell until 1991 to US$ 3,3 billion, a decrease of 20% (Sono, 1993: 
312). 
 
The Japanese Anti Apartheid Committee (JAAC) was the centre of anti-Apartheid 
activity in Japan. The JAAC was not a single organisation, but rather a federation of 
smaller regional groups across the country. The organisation established friendly ties with 
the African National Congress (ANC), including key figures such as Nelson Mandela and 
Oliver Tambo. It is often argued that the organisation was initiated to soften international 
criticisms of Japan’s policy towards South Africa in terms of trade, as well as to secure a 
place for Japan in the post-Apartheid era with a new government (Morikawa, 1997: 191, 
194). When Apartheid was starting to come to an end, after the election of F.W de Klerk, 
bilateral relations normalised gradually, which led to the resumption of diplomatic 
relations in 1992 (Aicardi de Saint Paul, 2002). 
 
Reconstructing the relationship between Japan and South Africa after Apartheid was 
more difficult than any of the two countries could imagine. Reinventing this relationship 
with its bureaucratic-institutional, state and non-state complexities was an exercise in 
finding a new basis for relations grounded in North-South exigencies and normalising 
these relations (Alden, 2002: 385). The most significant obstacle was that Japan had 
followed a dual approach. In order to improve relations with the new ANC government, 
the Japanese government presented, in 1994, the largest foreign assistance package, in the 
form of ODA that any donor has ever offered South Africa. From 1996 onwards, 
Japanese investment in the South African motor industry also started to intensify. The 
three leading companies were Nissan, Toyota and Bridgestone. In 1996 alone, R1,2 
billion was spent in the South African economy (Cornelissen, 2004: 125). The current 
commercial level still reflects the contours of the past: South Africa providing raw 
materials and a market for Japanese goods, though most importantly providing Japan 
with a springboard for business interests in the rest of the continent. Reinventing the post-
Apartheid relationship between Japan and South Africa has been a difficult political and 
economic process for both countries governments (Alden, 2003: 16-21). 
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2.6 Conclusion 
 
By discussing the evolution of the ties between Africa and Japan, it is clear that Japan’s 
interest in Africa was much more economic than political in nature, although their 
Security Council ambitions did play an important role. This chapter has also shown that 
although Japan was dependent on Africa for a stable supply of raw materials and natural 
resources for its economic expansion, South Africa was equally dependent on Japan 
because of its international isolation during Apartheid. Although Japan gradually built up 
an economic relationship with the continent, it never really had a strong diplomatic and 
emotional bond with Africa. This was mainly because it did not support the liberation 
movements during colonisation, and then also continued trade with South Africa whilst 
the rest of the world was condemning the country because of its racist policies. The main 
problem with Japan’s earlier Africa policy is the fact that the economic superpower was 
extremely slow to project a more human face in its diplomacy (Sono, 1993: 104). In 
terms of the end of the Cold War, security increasingly became more relevant for Japan 
since the bipolar security paradigm shifted, and in its search for economic security Africa 
was imperative for Japan. However, Japan’s role in providing ODA to African countries 
in order to promote human security brought along a shift in its African diplomacy, which 
will be discussed in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3: JAPANESE OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT 
ASSISTANCE (ODA) TO AFRICA AND HUMAN SECURITY 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Official development assistance (ODA) is a key feature of Japan’s foreign policy to the 
developing world. However, the significance of Japanese ODA to African countries has 
been neglected by scholars3 in the past, since most of the emphasis has been placed on 
ODA to Asian countries. Over the last decade, Japan’s ODA policies have caused much 
controversy because of increasing aid cuts and domestic pressures for the transparency 
and effectiveness of ODA. The aim of this chapter is to analyse the importance of ODA 
as a Japanese foreign policy tool, and more importantly how human security issues are 
addressed in Africa through the provision of ODA. Since the TICAD process provides a 
structural framework for development aid to Africa, the significance of all three TICAD 
meetings and the general role TICAD plays in African development will be discussed. 
Lastly, an overview will be given of Japan’s role in other multilateral organisations and 
initiatives such as the UN and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). 
The future direction of Japan’s ODA will also be discussed in order to comprehend how 
Japan has planned to implement the policies of TICAD. 
 
3.2 The historical foundations of Japanese ODA 
 
Over the last six decades, Japan has not only been a significant provider of aid, but also a 
recipient of foreign assistance. The country’s first involvement with aid was when it 
received aid after its economy had nearly collapsed following World War II (Akiko, 
2000: 153). Sato (2005) argues that Japanese ODA can be divided into five stages for a 
historical framework: the beginning of the Japanese aid diplomacy up to the first oil crisis 
(1954-1973); from the first oil crisis until 1980; the rapid expansion of Japanese aid 
(1981-1988); the period when Japan became a prime donor (1989-2000); and the last 
stage – the period when the Japanese government faced a fundamental shift in aid policy. 
These five stages will be discussed briefly: 
                                                 
3 These scholars include Orr (1990); Rix (1993) and Akira & Yasutami (1998). 
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 According to Akira and Yasutami (1998: 141, 142) the origins of Japanese aid can be 
traced back to the country’s membership in the Colombo Plan in 1954 which was a 
system of regional cooperation to promote economic and social development in South 
and Southeast Asia among member countries of the British Commonwealth. Following 
the Colombo Plan, Japan initiated its technical cooperation programme. The focus with 
respect to economic cooperation was on export credits and reparations, thus the ODA 
component was rather weak (MOFA, 2006). The fact that ODA was almost exclusively 
directed at Asian countries is equally important (Sato, 2005). Japan’s ODA gradually 
increased during the 1960s, and by the 1970s it accelerated. During the oil crisis in the 
1970s, structural adjustment loans became the global trend for aid activities (MOFA, 
2006).  
 
In 1989, Japan achieved the status as the world’s leading donor of ODA, and this 
continued throughout the 1990s. Japanese leaders also pledged to become better “aid 
citizens” by not only supporting economic development, but also social and political 
reforms in developing countries, including African countries. This was a significant 
foreign policy strategy of Japan to accentuate itself as an emerging middlepower. Japan’s 
new approach to aid was also welcomed by the members of the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), since Japanese aid aligned with the 
normative principles and qualitative standards of the OECD. The Japanese government 
only adopted a formal policy on developmental aid in June 1992, emphasising human 
rights and democratisation (Hook & Zhang, 1998: 1051).  
 
Cornelissen (2004: 118) argues that the expansion of Japan’s aid programme can be 
understood as the consequence of two factors: firstly, Japan’s rising economic importance 
was influenced by the immense pressure from the US for international burden sharing, 
and Japan used its aid programmes in such a manner to withstand this pressure from the 
US. Secondly, aid was a key element of Japan’s middlepowership which was increasing 
rapidly at that stage, along with the country’s heightened activism in multilateral 
organisations. 
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 A significant difference that has to be noted between ODA to Asian countries and ODA 
to Africa is that other than the Asian ODA which was in most part politically motivated, 
ODA to Africa was partly provided to serve Japan’s economic interests (Ampiah, 1997: 
56). However, Japan’s policies towards Africa were systematically adjusted as it adopted 
the human security approach and humanitarian concerns also played a more decisive role. 
These adjustments will be highlighted in the course of this chapter. 
 
 3.3 Japan’s African ODA policy 
 
3.3.1 What is ODA? 
 
Many forms of economic assistance to developing countries exist. What distinguishes 
ODA from other forms of aid is that its commitments are undertaken by governments 
with concessionary elements with much lower interest rates along with an extended 
repayment period for recipients. ODA is distinguished by the “grant element”, which is 
100% in the case of ODA, whilst it is 0% in the case of a commercial loan with an 
interest rate. Aid cannot be labelled ODA unless the grant element is over 25% (Akiko, 
2000: 153).  
 
In sum, ODA can be classified in two ways: firstly, it can be classified as a grant or loan. 
This depends on whether it involves the repayment of the principal and paying interest. 
ODA can also be classified as being on a “multilateral basis” or “bilateral basis”. This 
depends on whether the flow of the funds is directed to a specific country or to an 
international organisation (Akira & Yasutami, 1998: 163). In the case of Japan’s ODA to 
Africa, it has mostly been bilateral. Akira and Yasutami (1998: 85, 86) provide the 
requirements for ODA which further distinguishes it from other forms of aid and official 
flows to recipients: 
 
i) ODA must be administered by a government or government agency; 
ii) it has the main objective of promoting the economic development and welfare 
of the developing world (military aid is not included); and 
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iii) ODA has conditions that do not impose an extensive repayment burden on 
developing countries. 
 
Akira and Yasutami (1998: 165) also identified the three different forms of ODA namely 
grant aid, technical cooperation as well as government loans (yen loans). In the African 
context, Japanese ODA has mostly taken the form of grant aid and yen loans.  
 
3.3.2 Japan’s ODA policy for African development 
 
Throughout its aid policy Japan has emphasised agricultural, rural and human resources 
development. Japan’s has contributed to these different spectrums of development 
through technical assistance, emergency aid and crisis relief (Sono, 1993: 198). However, 
as argued in the previous chapter, Japan’s Cold War aid policy to Africa was mainly to 
serve its economic interests. In the late 1980s, Japan began to focus on poverty 
alleviation and meeting basic human needs in African countries, in conjunction with 
using aid as a strategic economic policy instrument. Thus, humanitarian concerns were 
carrying some weight in Japan’s foreign policy objectives. Japan also began to use aid to 
encourage recipient countries to adopt positive approaches to democracy and good 
governance which promotes the concept of human security (Eyinla, 1999:413).  
 
The MOFA announced its intention to revise the ODA Charter in December 2002. There 
were two principal reasons for this: firstly to reshape Japan’s ODA mandate to 
incorporate new ideas in terms of development since there were new challenges 
concerning global politics and economics following the end of the Cold War. Secondly, 
the government had to respond to domestic demands for a more solid ODA framework. A 
prominent feature of the new ODA policy making process was that several stakeholders 
such as political parties, intellectuals, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), business 
people and donor countries were included in dialogue. In August 2003, the Japanese 
government officially announced the reform of the ODA Charter. The main objective of 
the revised Charter is to “contribute to the peace and development of the international 
community, and thereby to help ensure Japan’s own security and prosperity”. The Charter 
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stated that the human security approach should be followed to address issues such as 
threats of conflict, natural disasters and infectious diseases (MOFA, 2006). The following 
diagram illustrates the importance of the different ODA policies and related projects: 
 
Figure 3.1 Japan’s ODA Policy Framework 
ODA 
CHARTER
MEDUIM-TERM POLICY ON ODA 
Clarifies Japan’s position, 
approaches and specific actions 
arding basic policies and prioreg rity 
areas
 
 
INDIVIDUAL PROJECTS 
COUNTRY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMMES 
Show’s Japan’s country-specific and sector-specific 
assistance plans and policies over a five year period 
 
Source: Diplomatic Bluebook, 2006: 200 
 
The main function of the ODA Charter as the top-level policy is to clarify the 
philosophies and principles of Japan’s ODA. Second is the Medium-Term Policy on 
ODA, which is the guideline that lasts for three to five years. Next are the Country 
Assistance Programmes, which provide the guidelines for implementing assistance for 
some recipient countries. Lastly, individual projects are used in order to ensure the 
efficient and effective implementation of ODA (Diplomatic Bluebook, 2006: 200).  
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3.3.3 ODA to African countries: changing patterns and current initiatives 
 
Aid to Africa commenced in 1966 when the first government loan was made to Uganda 
(Sono, 1993: 1999). Aid payments followed shortly thereafter to Kenya, Nigeria and 
Tanzania. Until the late 1960s Africa still received only 1% of Japan’s total aid and at the 
beginning of the 1970s less than 2% of all Japanese aid disbursements were directed to 
Africa. Nevertheless, ODA to Africa increased significantly from 1974 onwards. By 1980 
10% of Japan’s ODA budget was direct towards African countries (Cornelissen, 2004: 
118).  
 
When the Japanese Foreign Minister toured Ghana, Nigeria and Zaire in 1974, he 
announced that Tokyo would double African aid to 5, 2% of its total aid. Japanese aid to 
Africa rose steadily to 18, 9% in 1980 (Nester, 1991). From 1970 - 1980, bilateral aid to 
Africa increased nominally 27,5 times, whilst Japan’s national budget increased 
nominally only 5, 3 times (Sato, 2005). Between 1983 and 1987 Japanese ODA doubled 
to Africa from US$ 286 million to US$ 593 million. How did Tokyo determine whom to 
provide ODA to up until the late 1980s? As its aid became increasingly united during this 
time, Japan’s economic interests, especially natural resources played an important role in 
terms of where ODA was directed (Nester, 1991).  
 
During the Cold War period, Japan’s aid policy towards Africa was wholly devoted to 
three objectives as identified by Eyinla (1999: 413):  
 
i) to complement and reinforce the United States’s geo-strategic and ideological 
framework of the US/Japan cooperative strategic aid policy; 
ii) this strategic aid policy served as an instrument for access to raw and mineral 
sources and for expanding export markets; and 
iii) in the late 1980s, aid became a strategic diplomatic tool for pacifying African 
states who criticised Japan for being South Africa’s largest trading partner during 
Apartheid.  
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Thus, it can also be argued that during the 1980s Japan’s aid policy (specifically to sub-
Saharan Africa) was directed exclusively towards serving two main foreign policy 
objectives. Firstly, Tokyo wanted to promote positive political ties both within the 
context of the Cold War and to increase bilateral relations. A second important foreign 
policy goal was to repair relations with sub- Saharan Africa (Eyinla, 1999: 422). The 
following table illustrates Japanese ODA flows to the top ten African recipients until the 
late 1980s: 
 
Table 3.2 Top 10 African recipients of Japanese ODA cumulative to 1988 
         (Unit: US$ Million) 
 
Kenya 140, 2 
Tanzania 94, 2 
Zambia 87, 0 
Nigeria 81, 4 
Ghana 75, 9 
Zaire 61, 9 
Madagascar 45, 8 
Senegal 37, 1 
Malawi 30, 3 
Niger 27, 0 
 
 Source: Morikawa, 1997: 85 
 
Among OECD donors4, Japan has played a highly significant role in Africa, especially if 
the figures above are considered, since Japan made large ODA disbursements cumulative 
to 1988: between 1984 and 1998 the cumulative growth in net ODA disbursements from 
Japan was more than any other OECD country (Tuman & Ayoub, 2004: 44). By the 
1990s, Japan’s ODA to Africa had risen to US$ 580 million, 15, 2% of its total aid 
disbursements, and the launch of the new ODA Charter also had an important impact on 
                                                 
4 According to Masaki (2007) there are currently 22 major aid donors in the world, Japan ranks third. 
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ODA to the continent (Alden, 2002: 367, 368). One of the most significant aid grants that 
was made in the 1990s was Japan’s aid package of US$ 1, 3 billion to South Africa in 
1994 after the Apartheid era ended (Cornelissen, 2004: 123).  
 
The 1990s proved to contain more difficulties for Japanese foreign policy makers 
considering ODA. Firstly, the East Asian financial crisis of 1997 led to significant aid 
reductions by Japan, and secondly Tokyo had to start to punish aid recipients for 
neglecting conditionalities (Cornelissen, 2004: 118). Japan’s ODA to Africa in the 1990s 
was characterised by a “carrot-and-stick” approach, in terms of the aid recipient’s 
adherence to the principles of the ODA Charter (Eyinla, 1999: 424). In 1993 and 1994, 
Sierra Leone, Zaire, Kenya, Malawi and Nigeria were identified as violators of the ODA 
principles. Equally important, towards the end of the 1990s, Japan faced increasing 
domestic economic difficulties, and in 1996 its aid disbursement were cut by 35%. In 
2001, disbursements were again cut by 27% over the previous year, and in 2002 again 
reduced by 10%. These reductions were due to an ODA policy review by a committee 
appointed by Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto (Africa Recovery, 1997). Thus, it can be 
argued that Japan’s aid approach has taken a significant turn from the 1980s where the 
focus was on increasing amounts of aid. Due to domestic pressure the focus is rather now 
on the effectiveness of aid (Cornelissen, 2004:124). Table 2.3 illustrates the flow of ODA 
to African countries from 1979-1998. Those countries in bold are the top 10 recipients for 
this period: 
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Table 3.3: Mean levels of Net Japanese ODA to Africa 1979-1998 
(Mean: US$ Million) 
 
Algeria 0,5 
Benin 9,4 
Botswana 5,4 
Burkina Faso 5,6 
Burundi 5,3 
Cameroon 4,4 
CAR 11,3 
Chad 0,1 
Congo 0,6 
Egypt 150,6 
Gabon 0,3 
Gambia 3,2 
Ghana 60,1 
Guinea-Bissau 3,6 
Ivory Coast 21,9 
Kenya 86,2 
Lesotho 1,5 
Madagascar 25,3 
Malawi 29 
Mali 14,5 
Mauritania 14,4 
Mauritius 3,5 
Morocco 29,6 
Niger 16,8 
Nigeria 20,5 
Rwanda 8,1 
Senegal 34,5 
Sierra Leone 4,4 
South Africa 3,8 
Sudan 26,8 
Swaziland 2,7 
Togo 7,5 
Tunisia 11,5 
Zambia 51,1 
Zimbabwe 22,8 
 
Source: Tuman & Ayoub, 2004:47 
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As discussed, a constant and sufficient supply of natural resources is vital to Japan’s 
economy. Taking the trends of Japanese ODA disbursements discussed so far into 
account, it can be argued that Japan disbursed ODA to African countries in the past with 
the most natural resources. If this is a valid claim one can expect Japan to regenerate their 
ODA to African oil exporters, for example Angola5 in the very near future (Tuman & 
Ayoub, 2004: 45). In a study on Japanese ODA to Africa in the period 1979- 1998, 
Tuman & Ayoub (2004: 43) have found that humanitarian interests as measured by 
human rights, democracy and food insecurity were main determinants in Japan’s aid 
strategy and decisions. Their study tested for the effects of these new variables, which has 
not been examined previously in quantitative aid literature on ODA to Africa. Their study 
forms a strong contrast to the argument of this chapter and various other studies that 
Japanese national interests are a key determining factor of Japanese ODA disbursements. 
Although humanitarian concerns do play an important role in Japan’s ODA foreign 
policy, it is not the only decisive factor. Economic and diplomatic interests still also have 
an immense influence. 
 
Japan has achieved the status of the world’s largest bilateral ODA provider from 1991 up 
until 2000, and is currently the third largest provider of aid in the world (Kawai & 
Takagi, 2004: 257). In terms of the current ODA trends in Africa, Tanzania is one of the 
main recipients of Japanese aid. Since 2001 Japan has increased ODA to the country by 
nearly 500%. The main projects that were funded with aid were power sectors, 
infrastructure developments, agriculture and education (Business Times Tanzania, 2004: 
2). 
 
Currently, the following initiatives have also been made possible in Japan’s top ODA 
recipients: the “One Village One Product” programme which has been sponsored in 
conjunction with the UNDP in Malawi and Ghana. The programme promotes products 
unique to a specific region and aims to encourage people to use local resources and 
traditional techniques, thus revitalising the region. In Kenya, Japan has provided support 
for enhancing the Forest Bureau’s capability to promote the use of community forestry as 
                                                 
5 Angola is the second largest oil-exporter in Africa after Nigeria. 
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part of Japan supporting the “Green Revolution” to promote human security by funding 
projects that are essential to the economy.  In Uganda, the New Rice for Africa 
(NERICA) programme has been initiated which places emphasis on increasing rice 
production and rice cultivation technology in sub-Saharan African countries (MOFA, 
2006). In terms of other Japanese aid related activities, the role of the Japan Overseas 
Cooperation is particularly salient in Africa (Sato, 2005). These activities indicate that 
Japan is focusing on promoting human security, since it is addressing humanitarian 
issues, which forms a strong contrast to its Africa policies during the Cold War. 
 
3.3.4 Human security as an important element of Japan’s foreign policy through ODA 
 
The Japanese government has been confronted with a number of different approaches to 
broaden the concept of human security in its foreign policy since the 1950s. The MOFA 
first adopted an explicitly UN centred diplomacy and later Japan participated in the 
Bandung Conference which promoted the concept of humanity in conditions of a bipolar 
struggle. Finally, Japan attempted to introduce the concept of “comprehensive security” 
by providing ODA and diplomatic moderation in its relations with states through the 
Middle East and Asia. In the African context, Japan has been relatively successful in 
terms of placing more emphasis on the concept of human security through its financial 
grants and technical assistance to several African countries (Gilson & Purvis, 2003: 193). 
Japan’s security policy is also firmly based on its security cooperation with the US, and 
has formulated its foreign policy goals according to the US example (Edström, 2003: 
220). In terms of Japan’s objectives concerning ODA as an important part of its foreign 
policy, the ODA Charter specifies the objectives clearly in the first section. It restates the 
government’s commitment to support social and economic infrastructure development, 
human resource development, institution building in developing countries as well as 
addressing global issues such as HIV/AIDS, famine and poverty (Sunaga, 2004: 8). 
 
Hook and Zhang (1998: 1052) argue that in terms of economic and political motives, two 
Japanese aid policy discourses can be identified, namely the MOFA and the MITI 
(Ministry of International Trade and Industry). These two discourses in Japan’s ODA 
administration can be summarised as follows: the MOFAs prominent goals in terms of 
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ODA is the promotion of Japan’s international diplomacy, the improvement of economic 
and social conditions in poor nations, implementing agencies such as the Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the Japan Bank for International 
Cooperation (JIBC) through ODA loans, and lastly to have jurisdiction over UN 
agencies. In contrast to this, the MITI is focused on the promotion of Japan’s economic 
interest through the expansion of trade and investment and to assist the development of 
environmental industries and implementing agencies such as JICA (Kawai & Takagi, 
2004: 261). In the context of post-Cold War politics, and Japan shortly becoming the 
world largest aid donor thereafter, the MOFA discourse has proved more successful in 
Japanese policy making concerning ODA. The key reason for this is that its emphasis on 
promoting the concept of human security and promoting development in developing 
countries, proved more relevant. This is because Japan has been under increasing 
pressure for the reform of its aid policies. A second reason why the MOFA discourse is 
more appropriate is because Japan’s recent foreign policy strategy in terms of providing 
ODA, also have important political goals in conjunction with economic interests. Thus, 
Japan’s aspiring new role in global politics has also acquired the MOFA approach.  
 
States have had different approaches in addressing the concept of human security through 
their foreign policies, because of its ambiguity. It was only in 1998 in a speech by former 
Prime Minister Obuchi in Hanoi that human security was established as a key element of 
Japan’s foreign policy (Edström, 2003: 212). There is a clear contrast between the 
Japanese and Canadian governments (both are considered as middle powers) 
understanding of the concept. Their foreign developmental initiatives have thus also 
differed as a result of this. Human security can also be considered as a political leitmotif, 
which has provided a coherent normative framework for Japan’s foreign policy (Werthes 
& Boshold, 2006: 22, 24). The following diagram illustrates the interconnection and the 
Japanese and Canadian discourses: 
 
 
 
 
 41
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
Figure 3.4 The Range of Human Security Concepts 
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As a counter argument of where Japan is located in the spectrum of human security, 
Gilson and Purvis (2003: 200) argues that Japan can be criticized for abusing the human 
security agenda by adopting a pragmatic political approach, whilst it has to face up to 
domestic and external pressures. Adopting the concept of human security as central to 
their foreign policy, has been a strategy since the mid - 1990s, as well as the domestic 
pressure for the more efficient implementation of ODA. 
 
In terms of explaining Japan’s foreign policy behaviour in the context of providing ODA 
with the emphasis on human security, Neo-Realists have claimed that states do not only 
seek power, but also national economic interests which are important for both their 
domestic and global security. In the case of Japan, Neo-Realists have argued that Japan 
employs its foreign aid policy as an instrument to strengthen its national economy. An 
example would be that ODA to Africa has been used to create export opportunities for 
Japanese MNCs, since it commenced in the 1960s (Tuman & Ayoub, 2004: 45). 
However, the Neo-Realist perspective only explains one of Japan’s motives for providing 
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ODA, since humanitarian concerns also play an important role as explained by the 
Human Security Approach.       
 
3.4 The role of TICAD in promoting human security and development in Africa as 
part of Japan’s foreign policy 
 
3.4.1 The inception of TICAD and its main objectives 
  
The three Tokyo International Conferences on African Development (TICAD) have been 
instrumental in Japan’s Africa policy in promoting development through the concept of 
human security by encouraging trade and investment to the continent. The significance of 
TICAD for the purpose of this study is that it has been a complementary process to ODA 
for African countries. The TICAD process was launched in 1993 to promote policy 
dialogue on development between African leaders and development partners and is based 
on two dual principles: the “ownership” of African leaders in conjunction with 
international “partnership” (UNDP, 2003). The different approaches adopted to deal with 
the key issues at the three TICAD conferences have been South-south cooperation, 
human security and respect for African diversity (Diplomatic Bluebook, 2006: 123). In 
terms of TICAD and Japan’s Africa foreign policy, Lehman (2005: 423) notes that since 
the early 1990s, Japan has been the only developed country to consistently hold major 
international conferences focused on African development. This is significant since Japan 
only provides 10% of its ODA to Africa. It can thus be argued Japan’s strategy is to 
implement the new ODA Charter policies trough TICAD in order to direct a new way 
forward for ODA to Africa, but also to secure its diplomatic and economic interests. 
 
3.4.2 The TICAD process: goals for human development focusing on human security 
 
TICAD I 
 
At TICAD I, the “Tokyo Declaration on African development” was adopted and the 
importance of economic development was affirmed by all stakeholders. The conference 
in Tokyo was attended by 48 African representatives. The aim of the first conference was 
to illustrate the international community’s interest and commitment to African self-help 
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efforts for economic reconstruction (Morikawa, 1997: 203). In terms of the results of the 
conference, for the African side, it had more symbolism than economic substance 
because TICAD I only illustrated the donor countries intentions. They avoided any large-
scale pledge of aid and emphasised the self-help principle and recommended SAPs for 
the rebuilding of African economies. Japan obtained direct diplomatic results from 
TICAD I - it displayed to the international community its willingness to play an 
important role in Africa. Although Japan would never admit to it, the conference created 
a positive climate for the country’s campaign for a permanent seat on the Security 
Council (Morikawa, 1997: 204-206).   
 
TICAD II 
   
TICAD II was held in 1998, where the “Tokyo Agenda for Action” (TAA), a 
comprehensive implementation agenda was adopted. The period between TICAD I and II 
represented a different financial and geo-strategic environment since the end of the Cold 
War presented new issues to countries that provided ODA, as well as the demands of the 
East Asian crisis, which is significant in the case of Japan (Lehman, 2005: 430). The 
prioritised areas for this conference were the following: 
 
i) social development: education, health, gender equity; 
ii) economic development: agriculture, industry, support for the private sector; 
and 
iii) foundations for development: good governance and conflict prevention. 
(MOFA, 2003) 
 
In terms of the successful implementation of the TICAD II goals, the emphasis was on 
realising human-centred development based on the concept of human security. A plan 
was agreed at this conference to implement US$ 750 million over a five year period to be 
able to meet the goals of the conference. Since the first goal of TICAD II was social 
development, it was also decided that US$ 2 billion would be disbursed to education 
sectors in low-income countries. The “Basic Education for Growth Initiative” (BEGIN) 
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was then started for the education sectors of identified African countries. Various other 
initiatives in Africa were also emphasised which was funded by the Trust Fund for 
Human Security through the UN and also received financial support from the Japanese 
Government (MOFA, 1998). TICAD II was also important for Japan’s foreign policy 
because it provided the country with the confidence to initiate foreign policy endeavours 
or partnerships with other governments. In the African context, what made TICAD II 
significant for Africa is the fact that NEPAD was also brought into consideration and 
recognised for the first time by the MOFA (Lehman, 2005: 434). The most significant 
outcome of TICAD II was that the importance of human security was acknowledged in 
African development, and as a fundamental part of Japan’s foreign policy. 
 
TICAD III 
 
TICAD III was held in 2003 and the main agenda was peace and conflict resolution with 
the emphasis on human security. Other important themes that were discussed were 
governance, agricultural development, private sector development, infrastructure and 
human resources development focusing on education and health. Equally important, an 
explicit commitment was made to support NEPAD. The following extract of a speech by 
former Prime Minister Koizumi at the TICAD III conference illustrates Japan’s position 
on human security through the TICAD process: 
 
“Japan wishes to further dialogue with its African partners in order to address the 
question of how the people of Africa can become free from various threats against lives 
and human dignity including poverty, conflict and infectious diseases, in other words how 
Japan can contribute to ‘human security’ and realize a society in which people can live 
with hope” (TICAD, 2003). 
 
Whilst TICAD II put forward the proposition of the important role of the state, at TICAD 
III, Japan wanted to show to the international community that human security was indeed 
a possible rule of the game in achieving development in Africa (Horiuchi, 2005: 478). A 
political statement, the TICAD 10th Anniversary Declaration was adopted which 
emphasised the commitment of leaders for African development (MOFA, 2003). TICAD 
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III was also a benchmark since 23 African heads of state attended, whereas in 1993 at the 
first conference only three attended (Katzenellenbogen, 2003: 3). Prime Minister 
Koizumi opened the conference by pledging US$ 1 billion to African countries which 
would be in the form of grant aid over five years (Inside Asia, 2003: 2). However, 
TICAD III was characterised by African delegates severely criticising developed 
countries, especially Japan. This was because of earlier aid cuts to Africa.  The developed 
world was also accused of lacking the political will to provide aid to Africa (Cornish, 
2003: 1). South Africa played an important role at TICAD III, since President Thabo 
Mbeki courted for Japanese aid for Africa, as well as investment opportunities for 
Japanese businesses on the continent through the Japan International Cooperation Agency 
(JICA) (DFA, 2002). TICAD IV will be held in Tokyo in 2008. 
 
3.4.3 Successes and shortcomings of the TICAD process 
 
The TICAD process has without a doubt contributed immensely in highlighting 
partnerships with African countries, and focusing on African development. As discussed, 
TICAD has been an important part of Japanese diplomacy to establish itself as a global 
player since the end of the Cold War. Many promises have been made, and the 
importance of the contributions of the TICAD process has been acknowledged by the 
international community, although its progress can be criticised.  
 
In terms of promoting trade and investment to African countries, TICAD has contributed 
significantly to increased economic ties between Africa and Asia. For example, the 
amount of African exports to Asia has doubled from 1993 to 2003. Private funds have 
also far exceeded the amount of ODA to Africa in the form of trade and investment 
(MOFA, 2003). The World Bank has also reported that African exports to Asia are still 
relatively small, but has shown growth since 1993. Of the total export earnings estimated 
at about US$ 134 billion per year (2001-2003 average), 15% come from sales to Asia. 
The rate at which the export values have increased to Asia, at 10% per year has also been 
higher if compared to the EU or US (UNDP, 2005).  
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During the various TICAD processes, continuous emphasis was placed on increasing aid 
as well as cancelling debt to African countries. Since TICAD I, Japan has implemented 
assistance through ODA amounting to US$ 12 billion to the continent. From 1993 until 
2003, the Japanese government accepted more than 10 000 trainees from African 
countries and 7000 Japanese experts were dispatched to Africa (TICAD, 2003: 1). In 
2003, President Mbeki praised Japan for its contributions and delivering on its promises 
to contribute to promoting human security in the areas of health, agriculture and 
education through the Human Security Fund (Mbeki, 2003: 22).  
 
However, TICAD can also be criticised. Horiuchi (2005: 471) identifies the following 
shortcomings in TICAD I in the Tokyo declaration which had a direct negative spill-over 
to the following two conferences: 
 
i) agricultural development was only mentioned in connection with 
environmental and population issues; 
ii) the issue of economic dependency of African countries on the developed 
world – this issue was especially neglected by African representatives; 
iii) to encourage political reforms is not sufficient: corruption, poor governance 
and slow reform should have also been addressed; and 
iv) although Africa was encouraged to diversify exports, it remains the supplier of 
primary goods, and trade tariffs of the developed world were not adequately 
discussed. 
 
Another important criticism in terms of development projects that were initiated by the 
various TICAD processes is that it has not contributed to the overall development of 
Africa. Cornelissen (2004: 122) argues that although Japan claims to have adopted the 
Asian model in the African context, the low levels of Japanese investment and trade with 
Africa indicates otherwise. Equally important, because Japan’s earlier ties with Africa 
have been limited, the government does not have an adequate framework of the African 
economic and political contexts. Thus, many decisions following the three TICAD 
conferences have been based on the Asian experience. 
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 Lehman (2005: 441-442) also argues that after more than a decade the TICAD process 
has revealed a pattern of shortcomings: the goals of the various conferences have been 
very ambitious and broad, and it remained ambiguous and unclear of how it would be 
implemented. A second important shortcoming has been the absence of financial 
commitments, especially since all three conferences were purposefully non-pledging 
activities. Lastly, TICAD III was held during the beginning of the Iraq war, and the focus 
of the developed world was on the Middle East. Because of the lack of attention and 
commitment experienced during the last conference, concern exists that the relative 
success of TICAD III might not be enough to lead TICAD IV in 2008. 
 
Although the TICAD progress can rightfully be criticised, it has been highly successful in 
accomplishing the following foreign policy goals for the MOFA. Firstly, TICAD has 
been an important Japanese foreign policy tool for making a “comeback” after the Cold 
War period, and establishing economic ties with strategic African nations. Since Japan is 
now considered as a leader in promoting African development, TICAD has greatly 
contributed to the country’s image that was severely damaged by its significant trade with 
South Africa during Apartheid and significant aid cuts in the late 1990s. Lastly, whether 
all the promises have been delivered on or not, no other country has contributed as 
immensely as Japan in promoting Africa in terms of investment and aid, and thus the 
TICAD process has been of immeasurable value in that respect. 
 
3.4.4 NEPAD and TICAD as complementary initiatives for African development 
 
NEPAD was initiated in July 2001, when the 37th summit of the Organisation for African 
Unity (OAU), now the African Union (AU) adopted the NEPAD strategic framework 
document. The following objectives are central to NEPAD:  
 
i) the eradication of poverty; 
ii) to promote sustainable growth and development for African countries  
individually and collectively; and 
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iii) to stop the marginalization of Africa in the process of globalization and  
to fully integrate Africa into the global economy. 
 (Snoddy, 2005:1) 
 
The inception of NEPAD through the AU had a positive effect on the Japanese ODA 
process by formalising Africa’s willingness to assume ownership, governance and 
partnership over ODA. President Thabo Mbeki also referred to NEPAD as the “New 
Paradigm Shift of Africa”. This forms a strong contrast to previous SAPs, which were 
externally imposed on African countries – whilst NEPAD is based on the “self-help 
principle” (Lehman, 2005: 436). In terms of cooperation between Japan and African 
states, there has been a cooperative spirit, especially between South Africa and Japan. 
The TICAD and NEPAD partnership is a good example of a confluence of interests 
between two states regarding both initiatives for transforming the African continent 
through market orientated approaches that promote investment to encourage African 
development. The resemblance between NEPAD and TICAD is striking - both 
approaches emphasise African ownership and the responsibility of the process in the 
context of faith in market-orientated solutions for developmental issues whilst focusing 
on infrastructure development, privatisation and technological innovation as possible 
solutions (Alden, 2002: 383-385). The Peer Review Mechanism is an important 
component of NEPAD in which African countries can “rate” one another in terms of 
good governance, which has also been supported by TICAD III. This oversight function 
is expected to build a democratic system accompanied by transparency and accountability 
in Africa (Horiuchi, 2005: 477). The following extract from a speech from former Prime 
Minister Koizumi at the opening of TICAD III, reaffirms Japan’s support for NEPAD: 
 
“If to summarize the most important theme of TICAD III in a few words, I would say that 
it is to bring together knowledge and experiences of the international community in 
African development in Support of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD)”. (TICAD, 2003) 
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3.5 Future direction of Japan’s ODA 
 
3.5.1 The G8 summits 
 
The various G86 summits (previously the G7), have provided an important platform for 
Japan to put African development on the global agenda where eight of the world’s most 
powerful nations meet annually to discuss political economic issues. Japan has been 
considered the leader in promoting Africa’s issues in terms of debt cancellation and 
providing assistance in the form of grant aid for development. The G8 summits have also 
formed an important partnership with the TICAD process and NEPAD in pursuing 
mutual goals for African development. Among the former G7 creditors, Japan has 
provided the largest amount of bilateral loans to the 40 most heavily indebted countries, 
although its view on debt cancellation has differed from the other members of the G7 
(Lehman, 2005: 434). At the Gleneagles Summit in July 2005, the leaders of the G8 
agreed to increase aid for developing countries by US$ 50 billion. Prime Minister 
Koizumi also pledged to boost US$ 10 billion of Japanese aid between 2005 and 2009. 
Although the G8 leaders initially agreed to the full debt cancellation for 14 African 
countries, Japan argued that cancellation would bring about moral hazards among 
recipient countries. After much discussion, Japan later compromised with the other 
member states. The debt debate reflects the confrontation over the method of 
development preferred by key donors (Sato, 2005). 
 
The 2007 G8 summit has been held in Germany with African development as a key issue 
on the agenda (Rwamutega, 2007). Nishikawa (2007) argues that Japan, acting as the 
chair have been expected to ensure that African issues receive adequate attention. 
However, the 2007 summit has been met with widespread criticism for being a forum to 
promote capitalism to the benefit of developed countries. For the 2008 G8 summit and 
TICAD IV to be more successful, it is imperative that Japan combines its efforts with 
joint objectives for African development at the G8 summit in 2008. An increased 
emphasis should be on promoting the concept of human security for more coherence in 
its own foreign policy. 
                                                 
6 The G8 includes the US, Germany, Russia, Japan, Italy, France, China and Canada. 
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3.5.2 Japanese ODA at crossroads 
 
Since the turn of the century, Japan has been facing challenges both internally and 
externally since the government no longer enjoys public support to maintain high levels 
of ODA. One of the most important external influences has been the process of 
globalisation, which has changed the types of global issues that Japan has to respond to, 
especially in Africa. Internationally Japan has been criticised severely for only lending 
too infrastructure development and its hesitation to participate in a more multilateral 
framework. One of the most important issues that Japan will have to deal with currently 
and in the future is the emergence of China, who as an increasingly important global 
economic player and possible military threat to Japan. This has also led to decreased 
support from the public for an increase in ODA (Kawai & Takagi, 2004: 274-275). The 
MOFA has also recognised the need to adapt its ODA policies in the “new international 
milieu” which is characterised by the rise of other prominent new global players such as 
Brazil, Russia and India (MOFA, 2006). 
 
Sunaga (2004: 26-29) has identified four measures that the Japanese government should 
strive for in the future for the more effective implementation of ODA policies: 
 
i) increased coherence in policymaking; 
ii) strengthening policy dialogue with developing countries; 
iii) increased collaboration with aid-related entities; and 
iv) improved ODA procedures. 
 
The MOFA has realised that the above challenges have to be addressed considering the 
new role of ODA, and various discussions have been held considering ODA reforms. As 
a result of these discussions, the Overseas Economic Cooperation Council (OECC) was 
established in April 2006 to serve as headquarters to examine important issues 
concerning ODA. In August 2006, the International Cooperation Bureau was also 
established under the MOFA which will play the core role in coordinating ODA planning 
and the formulation of ODA policies. The MOFA has also decided that in order to 
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improve the effectiveness of ODA through enhanced coordination between instruments 
such as yen loans, technical assistance and grant aid, JICA and the JIBC will be 
integrated in October 2008 (MOFA, 2006). Sunaga (2004: 30) rightfully argues that 
policy objectives are easily set, however seldom fulfilled. Nevertheless, the revised 2003 
ODA Charter has provided the foundation for reshaping ODA to respond more 
effectively to the needs of the developing world, and it also clearly indicates the direction 
of ODA in the future. Partnership and decentralisation are the most likely approaches to 
make out the dynamics of Japan’s future ODA. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter human security as an important element of Japanese ODA to Africa was 
discussed in the context of Japan’s foreign policy goals. The various bilateral and 
multilateral initiatives, of which Japan has been part of, were assessed in terms of their 
role in promoting development in Africa. Attention was given to the TICAD process, and 
its significance in terms of ODA and human security since it indicated the most 
significant shift in Japan’s ODA policies, prior to the revision of the ODA Charter in 
2003. What has been derived from this chapter by assessing the Japanese ODA patterns 
in the African context is that it was mostly influenced by economic interests and 
diplomatic considerations for a permanent seat on the Security Council, as well as to 
address its controversial trade relationship with South Africa. Japan has followed a 
different approach than other developed countries, by focusing on human security in 
order to promote development in Africa. At the turn of the millennium the visit of Prime 
Minister Mori indicated that the Japanese ODA discourse has shifted, and that Japan has 
adopted new ODA reform policies to its foreign policy to Africa. In sum, the current 
focus of Japan’s ODA is rather on quality than quantity based on the concept of human 
security. In the next chapter, peacekeeping and peacebuilding will be discussed as a part 
of Japan’s foreign policy to Africa, as well as how the concept of human security has 
influenced Japan’s approach. 
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CHAPTER 4: JAPANESE PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA AND 
PROMOTING HUMAN SECURITY 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In the preceding chapter, the importance of the concept of human security in Japan’s 
foreign policy towards Africa in the context of ODA was put forth and analysed. In this 
chapter, the importance and nature of Japanese peacekeeping in Africa in order to 
promote human security will be discussed. Together with ODA, peacekeeping has been 
one of the most important pillars of Japan’s Africa policy to promote human security on 
the continent. ODA and peacekeeping also go hand in hand since most peacekeeping 
operations for humanitarian and technical assistance are funded by ODA. The reason for 
this is that peacekeeping has become increasingly important to Japan’s policy towards 
developing countries. This is mainly due to the fact that the post-Cold War era has 
brought new types of conflicts which pose threats to human security. This has thus 
brought along a significant shift in Japan’s foreign policy towards peacekeeping. This 
chapter also aims to explore and explain how the government intends to promote human 
security through United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions and how it seeks to meet 
diplomatic goals in this regard. 
 
Although there are other examples7 worth discussing, the focus will be on Japanese 
assistance to Mozambique and the more recent ongoing civil war in Darfur, Sudan. The 
rational for focusing specifically on these two countries, is firstly because Mozambique is 
considered by the international community as a relative success in terms of peacekeeping, 
and secondly because the more recent conflict in Sudan has resulted in a humanitarian 
crisis and a peacekeeping failure. The nature of Japan’s contributions to these countries 
also varies. The contribution of Japan’s peacekeeping assistance in these two countries 
will be assessed in terms of improving different aspects of human security and Japan’s 
foreign policy strategy. Japan’s role in multilateral organisations such as the UN and AU 
                                                 
7 According to the Diplomatic Bluebook (2006: 154) Angola (1991-1995) and Rwanda (1994) have been 
the only other countries where Japan has participated in UN PKOs. 
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will also be analysed. Lastly, the future direction of Japan’s peacekeeping assistance in 
the African context will be discussed and proposals will be made. 
 
4.2 Brief overview of conflict in Africa 
 
The argument made by Edström (2003: 209) that the end of the Cold War brought with it 
a new kind of war - the plight of civilians, as mentioned in the first chapter, is also of 
particular relevance here. Thomas (1999: 9) argues that Africa’s history is essential to 
understanding the causes of human insecurity on the African continent, since Europe 
severely underdeveloped Africa through colonisation. The main African colonial powers 
– Britain, France, Portugal, Belgium, Italy and Germany played crucial roles in the 
penetration and exploitation of the African continent. Africa’s post-colonial history, 
which has been characterised by violent conflicts and civil wars, was shaped in part by 
the manner through which the colonial powers occupied the continent and the political 
and economic institutions that were part of their imperial purposes. In many African 
countries, for example Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, the legacies 
of these processes continue with their built-in tension that often explodes into inter-state 
and intra-state conflicts (Selassie, 2001: 3, 4). Towards the end of the Cold War, and 
when Apartheid later came to an end in South Africa, hopes were high that Africa’s wars 
would also be resolved. However, the 1990s saw even more wars in African countries, 
mainly because of military entrepreneurs who initiated these wars (de Waal, 2000: 24, 
51).  
In the context of post-colonial politics in Africa where states are going through nation 
building, different ethnic groups were left to fend for themselves within artificial borders. 
Ever since, it has been an onward struggle for most African states to forge a nation state 
which consists out of culturally diverse groups. Briefly, issues of personal rivalry, ethnic 
hostility, factional feuds and ideological rifts began to spill over into civil wars. Because 
of the corruption of many African governments, there was also an increasing alienation 
from the rest of society and the idea of “us versus them” (Selassie, 2001: 4, 5). Corrupt 
governments have meant that many African states today only represent the “shell” of the 
territorial state where national security is only equal to the governing elite. In most cases 
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the governing elite only “govern” for their own self-interest and do not take human 
security issues and development into consideration. Such states are often referred to as 
shadow or quasi-states, where the regime “feeds of the state carcass for its own survival” 
(Cilliers, 2004: 16). Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan also argued in 2000 that 
“states are sometimes the principal perpetrator of violence against the very citizens that 
humanitarian law requires them to protect” (Annan in Edström, 2003: 209). The 
following argument by Solomon (2003: 2) which parallels that of Annan, summarises 
Africa’s conflict crises appropriately: 
“As Africa burns, its leaderships hold summits, proudly congratulating themselves on yet 
another talk-shop successfully concluded. It is blatantly obvious that there can be no 
African Renaissance, no talk of the 21st century being an African century, as long as 
conflict continues to be the bane of the ordinary African man, woman and child” 
 
It is not only in Africa where there has been a dramatic increase in conflicts which 
threaten human security: globally, wars and conflict have surged between 1990 and 2001, 
with 57 major armed conflicts in 45 countries. In 2001, there were 24 armed conflicts, 
most of which were in Africa, and 11 of these have lasted for at least eight years (Human 
Security Now, 2003: 21). The upsurge of these violent wars throughout the African 
continent has led to a direct attack on all the aspects of human security of African people. 
Although there is currently no, or very little past colonial influence in African states, the 
continent as a whole is being marginalised by the global system of capitalism of which it 
is not reaping the benefits, and which is constantly being reinforced by the process of 
globalisation. Thus the need exists for external assistance in the form of peacekeeping 
and peacebuilding to aid African countries to bring these wars to an end. For Japan, 
which has benefited from trading with Africa, and often pronounces its commitment to 
the development of the continent, this in part means an increase in its efforts to assist 
Africa via the UN. 
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4.3 The relationship between human security, peacekeeping and peacebuilding 
 
Rose (2000: 123) defines peacekeeping as “activities that ensure international peace and 
security”. Sato (2005) argues that the concept of “peacebuilding” only became widely 
known with the publication of two related reports, the “Agenda for Peace” in 1992 and a 
report by former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Both these concepts have 
a direct relationship with the concept of human security in that if international peace and 
security is threatened in any way, there will be an increase in human insecurity, whether 
in a certain region, continent or globally. During civil wars and conflict situations in 
African countries, very little human security exists for citizens since they are deprived 
from all the components that make up human security as defined by the 1994 UNDP 
report: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal 
security, community security and political security. Thus the argument can be made that 
there is an important relationship between peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and promoting 
the human security of the people of a specific country. 
 
Failed8 African states which have suffered because of ongoing conflict, as noted by 
Solomon (2003: 1), have lost their ability to successfully govern, and in many instances 
have become a serious threat to regional and global peace and stability. Ethnic conflicts, 
poverty and conflict over economic benefits, and the lack of governing functions to solve 
these issues, have formed the basis of many African conflicts. Thus, humanitarian aid in 
support of development, reconstruction and democratisation through ODA as provided by 
Japan in the cases of Mozambique and Sudan can play an important role in resolving 
these conflicts. This can be done in addition to military and political methods employed 
by the UN Peacekeeping Operation (PKO) in conjunction with peace mediation and 
preventative diplomacy (MOFA, 2006). The importance of ODA in peacekeeping 
operations can be explained by the Human Security Approach, since it argues that the 
state is not the sole provider of security to its citizens, and that other actors can contribute 
to improve human security issues on foreign territory, for example NGOs. According to 
                                                 
8 According to Dugard (2005: 109) a failed state is a recognised state that has descended into anarchy and 
lawlessness to such an extent that it ceases to meet the requirements of statehood. Although it retains its 
territory and population, it lacks a central and effective government, which is in many cases are controlled 
by warlords. 
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the Human Security Approach it is also important to understand other issues that threaten 
human security, as in the case of this chapter: conflict.  
 
The Human Security Now (2003: 33) report proposes the following policy measures to be 
followed by the international community when intervening in conflicts and contributing 
to peacekeeping operations in order to increase the human security of the civilians 
involved: 
 
i) human security should be mainstreamed in the agenda’s of international, 
regional and national security; 
ii) respect for the principles guiding humanitarian action is essential when 
developing comprehensive strategies linking the political, military and 
humanitarian dimensions of protecting people in conflict; 
iii) upholding human rights and humanitarian law is essential in protecting and 
empowering people in conflict; 
iv) concerted efforts are required to disarm people and fight crime; 
v) violent conflict must be prevented and mitigated in collapsed states and 
contested territories, while fully upholding all rights; and 
vi) the right of each person to a nationality should be respected, and measures are 
needed to ensure effective citizenship, a condition for attaining human security. 
 
These measures indicate the importance of the relationship between peacekeeping and 
upholding certain principles in order to promote human security. It also signifies the 
subsequent awakening and realisation on the part of civil society and the international 
community of the importance of non-state security threats that civilians face in conflict 
situations. 
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4.4 Japan’s foreign policy on peacekeeping: the shift from pacifism to an advocate of 
human security 
 
When the Diet passed the International Peacekeeping Law in 1992, Japanese forces, or so 
called Self-Defence Forces (SDFs) were allowed for the first time since 1945, to embark 
on foreign missions due to the fact that the 1952 law (Article 9 of its Constitution) 
prohibited this. It also stipulated that Japan was not allowed to have military forces, 
which was interwoven within the fundamental anti-militarism political culture of Japan 
following the bloodshed of World War II (Zisk, 2001: 21, 22). Japan’s foreign policy in 
terms of peacekeeping missions had been characterised by pacifism following World War 
II. However, the last fifteen years have seen a significant shift from pacifism to an 
increase in partaking in humanitarian operations, mostly in the form of technical 
assistance and logistical support.  
 
The first important controversy since 1945 concerning Japan’s military role in the 
international community came during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, when 
President George Bush Sr. recognised Japan’s constitutional constraints, especially in 
terms of its ‘non-bloodshed’ policy towards conflict. Soeya (2005: 104) also argues that 
Japan’s steady progress to increase participation in international and human security 
issues, has to be understood in the context of the US-Japan alliance. Nevertheless, 
Japan’s quest for a more significant role in global affairs led to a consensus developing 
among the public and politicians, that Japan should play a more active role in maintaining 
international peace and security (Ishizuka, 2005: 67, 68). Akiyama (2004: 6) also argues 
that the Japanese government needed to adjust its foreign policy architecture in order to 
respond to and take advantage of emerging issues and new threats in the post-Cold War 
period. In this regard, African conflict has provided an important diplomatic opportunity 
for the Japanese to promote human security. 
 
Since the International Peace Cooperation Law was enacted in 1992, Japan has been 
increasingly more active and cooperating in peacekeeping missions, humanitarian relief 
operations and election monitoring activities through the UN (MOFA, 2005). This law 
 58
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
was a result of the increasing international criticism of Japan’s security policy during the 
1991 Gulf War. Consequently the argument can be made that the Gulf War had a 
profound impact on Japan’s foreign policy in terms of peacekeeping, and steered it into a 
new direction. An important question can be raised of Japan’s shift in roles from passive 
observer to a more active contributor to peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations since 
the Gulf War. Ishizuka (2005: 67) argues that the answer lies in a Liberalist paradigm, in 
terms of Japan being an advocate of human security. One can also argue that the MOFAs 
decision to not only make financial contributions to peacekeeping missions, but also a 
human contribution, with the focus on human security, can be explained by the Human 
Security Approach. This is due to the fact that Japan made the shift to recognising that 
civilians have human security needs during conflict. However, most importantly that 
conflict is one of the single most prominent threats to human security (Ishizuka, 2005: 67, 
70). 
 
The International Peace Cooperation Law of 1992 included the five principles for the 
participation of a Japanese contingent in peacekeeping missions. These principles have 
been the centre of controversy in Japan’s peacekeeping role via the UN, due to its 
restrictive nature: 
 
i) agreement on the ceasefire shall have been reached among the parties to 
conflict; 
ii) the parties to the conflict, including the territorial states, shall have given their 
consent to deployment of the peacekeeping force and Japan’s participation in 
the force; 
iii) the peacekeeping force shall maintain strict impartiality, not favouring any 
party to the conflict; 
iv) should any of the above requirements cease to satisfy the Government of 
Japan, it may withdraw from the contingent; and 
v) use of weaponry shall be limited to the minimum necessary to protect the lives 
of personnel etc. 
(Ishizuka, 2005: 69) 
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 In the context of African conflicts, these principles are not appropriate in their entirety: in 
terms of the first principle, it is usually only when a conflict nears the end when parties 
agree on a ceasefire, thus Japan’s contribution would be minimal during the 
peacekeeping process. In many African conflicts, it is often the government and a 
liberation movement which are at war, therefore the likelihood of all the parties giving 
their consent to the deployment of forces within their borders are extremely small. 
Principle five is the most restrictive principle since weapons are exclusively used to 
protect personnel. The implication of this is that the SDF can never partake in any real 
peacekeeping force. An example of this restrictive nature will be provided in the case of 
Mozambique in the next section. 
 
Japan is considered a middlepower in international relations because it is a wealthy 
country that exercises regional influence. Although it boasts the second largest economy 
in the world after the US, it lacks the military power and diplomatic influence to be a true 
global power, and consequently its policies on peacekeeping are particularly interesting 
(Zisk, 2001: 22). Until the mid-1990s, Japan’s involvement in Africa’s conflicts was 
limited to humanitarian assistance, mostly through the UN and the sharing of the 
financial burden of UN activities on the continent. A key reason for Japan not initiating 
any diplomatic measures for conflict prevention and resolution, is that firstly, Japan did 
not have any vital interests in Africa, and secondly because it is not allowed to use 
military forces in international relations (Ochiai, 2001: 42). To compensate for this, Soni 
(1999) argues that Japan has chosen to follow the strategy of “niche diplomacy”, often 
employed by middlepowers. Niche diplomacy takes into consideration factors such as 
national interest and financial constraints. Middlepowers such as Japan then advocate that 
countries should concentrate their resources in a specific area, in order to best generate 
returns, rather than trying to cover the entire field. In this context the concept of human 
security is relevant, since it is Japan’s chosen strategy of niche diplomacy and it does not 
involve partaking militarily in any UN missions. In spite of this, Japan is still allowed to 
partake in humanitarian projects, which is also unique to its foreign policy since no other 
country has advocated the concept of human security as much as Japan has over the last 
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decade. From a Structural Realism point of view, where the state is viewed as the primary 
provider of human security, Japan’s behaviour is explained by its need to secure a 
powerful position in global politics, by being a provider of security, in national, regional 
and international terms. 
 
In the Diplomatic Bluebook of 2006, the MOFA states that Japan currently follows a 
“comprehensive approach” to conflicts. This is due to the fact that Japan believes that in 
order to resolve conflicts permanently and to lead affected regions and countries to 
sustainable reconstruction, it is necessary for the international community to unite in 
order to promote efforts at a “consolidation of peace” approach. This approach is 
composed of the following three stages: 
 
i) promotion of peace processes;  
ii) securing of domestic stability and security; and 
iii) the restoration of the peaceful lives of people. 
 
Taking these three stages into account, it is clear that Japan still chooses to follow a ‘non-
bloodshed’ approach by focusing on different aspects of human security, such as political 
and economic stability in order for people to live in a secure environment. In order to 
support these principles, Japan has used diplomatic means such as ODA to put forth 
efforts in conjunction with organisations such as the UN, other member states and NGOs 
(Diplomatic Bluebook, 2006: 151). These initiatives in the cases of Mozambique and 
Sudan will be discussed in more depth in the following section.  
 
On the MOFAs website, its official foreign policy on peacekeeping is stipulated as 
follows: 
 
“Japan’s policy is to actively contribute to realizing the peace and stability of the 
international community. Based on past experiences and achievements, Japan will 
continue to coordinate with international organizations, other donor countries, the 
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domestic private sector and NGO’s to develop human resources who will be able to 
perform on the ground”. (MOFA, 2006) 
 
During recent years, the international community has recognised the importance of 
comprehensive “conflict prevention” and “peacebuilding”. These two terms do not only 
refer to “conflict resolution” and ending conflicts as such. It also includes the process of 
eliminating the causes of conflict, preventing it from worsening, promoting their early 
resolution, and avoiding their recurrence through achieving social stabilisation and 
restoration following the conclusion of the peace agreement. Japan has thus far actively 
supported the “consolidation of peace” and nation building in various African countries 
(Diplomatic Bluebook, 2006: 152). The following diagram illustrates Japan’s assistance 
aiming toward “consolidation of peace” principles: 
 
Figure 4. 1: “The Consolidation of Peace” 
 
Japan’s assistance that aims toward “consolidation of peace” consists of the following 
three pillars: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Diplomatic Bluebook 2006€ 
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Securing of domestic stability and 
security 
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• Establish domestic security 
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• Disarmament, demobilization 
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Humanitarian and 
reconstruction assistance 
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repatriation and 
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and internally displaced 
persons 
• Restoration of lifelines 
(basic infrastructure) 
Source: Diplomatic Bluebook, 2006: 152 
 
The idea of “consolidation of peace” was announced in 2002 by the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, which is based as illustrated above on the peace process of security, 
reconstruction and humanitarian assistance. Based on this concept, Japan has provided 
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support during conflicts for election preparations, media support, the reconstruction of 
local communities and infrastructure development (MOFA, 2006). The three pillars of 
the “consolidation of peace” that have been identified are first and foremostly to assist the 
process from conflict to reconstruction: this would include implementing measures such 
as assistance to refugees, de-mining and electoral assistance. Subsequently, the conflict 
settlement functions of African regional organisations are to be enhanced. (This will be 
discussed in a later section of this chapter.) The third and last step is conflict prevention 
at grass-roots level by promoting the efforts for broad-based conflict prevention through 
regional and civil society (MOFA, 1998). 
 
If one considers the three pillars, the emphasis is placed on human security, especially on 
issues that people who live in war-affected countries face in their daily lives. For 
example, under pillar two the focus is on establishing a domestic security system, the 
disposal of landmines and under pillar three, projects include assistance to refugee’s and 
the restoration of lifelines. Although in pillar one, the promotion of the peace process is 
emphasised in terms of the parties that govern it and those who were at war, the focus 
remains on promoting human security. 
 
In an attempt by the MOFA to create and maintain solidarity between Japan and Africa, 
and to implement the three pillars of the “consolidation of peace”, two central initiatives 
have been identified. Firstly, to enhance synergy between the NEPAD and TICAD 
processes as discussed in Chapter 3, and secondly to promote efforts to ensure steps so 
that peace would not regress during conflict prevention and the “consolidation of peace”. 
The recent trends in Japanese foreign military deployment (for example Iraq) illustrates 
that Japan’s foreign policy towards international security has come to include not only 
participation in the traditional UN peacekeeping missions, but also in coalition-type 
missions (Isozaki, 2005). The September 11 terrorist attacks have also without a doubt 
brought on policy changes for the Japanese. This is because the global security structure 
experienced the most important shift since the end of the Cold War and US security 
policy changes have impacted the US-Japan security alliance.  
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4.5 Japanese peacekeeping involvement in African conflicts 
 
4.5.1 Mozambique 
 
Mozambique as a state became independent from Portugal in 1975, after a prolonged 
divisive anti-colonial war fought by the Mozambique Liberation Movement (Frelimo). 
One of the core reasons for Mozambique’s conflict is the fact that when Portugal granted 
Mozambique its independence, no provision was made for democratic elections. In 1977, 
the opposition party, RENAMO was born and its leader proclaimed the “Second War of 
Liberation” which initiated the civil war (Thomashausen, 2003: 273, 276, 277). The UN 
intervened only in December 1992 with the peacekeeping operation ONUMOZ that 
lasted until December 1994 (Diplomatic Bluebook, 2006: 154-155). However, the 
simultaneous dismantling of guerrilla and government forces and the creating of a single 
army severely compromised the peace process. The 1992 Rome Peace Accord envisaged 
a 30 000 man strong national army which would be drawn from both former guerrilla 
fighters and government troops. This was nevertheless viewed with suspicion by all 
parties involved (Albrecht, 2000: 131). 
 
Following the Cold War, within Southern Africa, Mozambique was one of the countries 
for which Japan had to renew its foreign policy due to the significant change that took 
place within the global security structure (Alden, 2003: 113). From 1984 onwards, three 
major historical events in Mozambique attracted Japan’s attention:  
 
i) the Famine campaign from 1984- 1985 caused by RENAMO in which 100 
000 people died; 
ii) the Anti-Apartheid movement since 1988: the Apartheid government’s 
policies towards Mozambique; and 
iii) the participation of ONUMOZ dispatching SDFs in 1993. 
(Sato, 1994:105) 
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In May 1993, six soldiers of the Japanese Self-defence force (SDF) arrived in Maputo to 
participate in ONUMOZ, and this marked Japan’s third participation in an UN 
peacekeeping mission (MOFA, 1996). What is the significance of all of this? Firstly, 
these soldiers were the first contingent of a group of 53 members to be dispatched to 
Mozambique, and secondly it was the first military force in Japan’s history ever stationed 
in Africa. However, the MOFA has been criticised for its lack of understanding of the 
context of the Mozambican war, especially because as explained in Chapter 2, Japan 
viewed the African continent as distant and unfamiliar. Japan’s assistance to 
Mozambique was also seated in the self-help principle, which is an important 
characteristic of its ODA to Africa (Sato, 1994: 105-106). The MOFA viewed the 
dispatch of SDFs to Mozambique as an opportunity to demonstrate its initiative through 
its policy of a “contribution to the international community”, and equally important to 
show that it was worthy of a permanent seat on the Security Council (Ochiai, 2001: 41, 
42). 
 
Between May 1993 and January 1995, Japan contributed to ONUMOZ by dispatching 
five people for headquarters service, forty eight for transportation and coordination 
services and nineteen for election verification services over a period of eighteen months. 
In financial terms, Japan also contributed through the UNDP a total of US$ 1.6 million in 
1999, this included the assistance given to the Mine Clearance Project in the Gaza 
Province. The total cumulative cultural grant from 1975 until 2004 totalled at 120.2 
million yen (MOFA, 2005). In terms of peacebuilding and the focus on promoting human 
security, three teams of more than forty five people were sent to the Golan Heights for 
road repairs, transportation and other administrative duties between February 1996 and 
August 1998 (Rose, 2000: 128). 
 
Several practical difficulties were experienced by the SDF in ONUMOZ because of the 
fifth principle under Japan’s Peacekeeping Law, due to the fact that weapons were only 
allowed to be used for self-defence. In one instance, the UN command feared that the 
political situation in the ONUMOZ mission could break down, and it was decided to 
prepare an emergency evacuation plan. According to the plan, the Japanese unit was 
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ordered to take its turn in guarding the retreat. The SDF was forced to decline the order, 
because of the fifth principle. The entire plan had to be rewritten, much to the 
embarrassment of the supervising Japanese officers (Zisk, 2001: 28).  
 
From a Structural Realism point of view, it can be argued that the Japanese did not send 
the SDF out of deep consideration or out of sympathy for the Mozambican people but 
rather because Japan was more concerned with its strategic position in the post–Cold War 
order, as well as its UN ambitions in terms of the Security Council (Sato, 1994: 100). An 
important criticism against Japan is the fact that its activities were mostly confined to 
logistics such as transport (Reliefweb, 2005). Nevertheless, Japan’s peacekeeping 
assistance to ONUMOZ is highly significant because of the shift that it indicated in the 
MOFAs foreign policy towards peacekeeping. 
 
4.5.2 Sudan 
 
Identity disputes and religion lies at the heart of Sudan’s ongoing civil war between the 
North and the South. Since its independence in 1956, the country has been caught up in a 
conflict in which more than 200 000 people have died, and more than 2 million have been 
displaced (Diplomatic Bluebook, 2006: 156, Sudan Tribune, 2007). Nantulya (2003: 105) 
argues that the complexity of the conflict situation in Sudan has contributed to the 
regional and international neglect of one of Africa’s longest and most devastating wars. 
The main protagonists in this conflict are the successive Northern ruling elites and the 
Southern resistance forces. The key liberation movements are the Sudan Peoples 
Liberation Movement and Army (SPLM/SPLA), as well as the Justice and Equality 
Movement (JEM). The Northern elite mainly view themselves as Arabic/Islamic, whilst 
those in the South are mainly Christians (2003: 105). According to the report Human 
Security Now, (2003: 29) in 2000 approximately only 60% of Sudan’s humanitarian 
needs were met by plights for humanitarian assistance to the international community. 
 
The UN mission in Sudan (UNMIS) was dispatched in March 2005, since no former 
peace accords were successful (Diplomatic Bluebook, 2006: 155-156). A draft resolution 
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called for a 10 000 strong peace force to back the peace accord (Reliefweb, 2005). The 
UN urged Japan to further participation in international peacekeeping operations, and 
requested that Japan take part in UNMIS. This was because of its continued ODA cuts to 
developing countries, in particular to Africa (Kyodo News International, 2005). Sudan, as 
in the case of Mozambique, has proven to be problematic for Japan’s foreign policy 
makers in the MOFA because it renounced the use of force after World War II. It has 
chosen to rather follow a path of technical assistance through ODA as discussed in the 
previous chapter on Japanese ODA (ReliefWeb, 2005). In order to evade the pressures 
from the UN for participation in UNMIS and the sending of SDFs in April 2005, Japan 
announced that it would provide financial support for the consolidation of peace in 
Sudan. US$ 100 million was promised, and so far US$ 88 million has been disbursed. In 
addition, US$ 10 million additional humanitarian assistance was promised. The following 
table illustrates Japan’s ODA disbursements to Sudan, based on the idea of consolidation 
of peace without partaking in the conflict, or sending SDFs: 
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Table 4.2: Japan’s ODA to Sudan peacekeeping from 2005-2006 
 
Date obligated Project Amount 
approx. 
(US 
million) 
April 2005 • Mine/UXO Survey, clearance, mine risk 
education 
• Assistance to small-scale subsistence fishery 
• Emergency Survey, Limited Mine Clearance 
and Explosive Ordnance Disposal in Darfur 
7.00 
 
1.02 
   0.3 
July 2005 • Food aid for returning displaced persons to 
South Sudan and receiving local communities 
• Emergency provision of starter packs to 
returnees and vulnerable host communities in 
South Sudan 
• Infectious diseases protection for children 
through UNICEF 
      4.95 
 
      0.93 
 
 
      5.31 
September 2005 • Emergency road repair and mine clearance in 
South Sudan 
• Return and reintegration of Sudanese refugees 
to Southern Sudan 
• Humanitarian assistance for Sudanese IDP’s 
and Returnees in West Darfur 
• Project for expansion of primary education in 
Southern Sudan 
• Facilitating sustainable return of IDP’s in 
Sudan 
      9.99 
 
      5.89 
 
3.04 
 
 
8.60 
 
4.63 
October/November 
2005 
• Food aid for displaced persons from Darfur in 
Sudan and Chad 
• Grant aid for interim disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration program 
4.49 
 
7.14 
February 2006 
 
• Emergency assistance for Hospital care 
programme in Juba 
2.0 
 
May 2006 
 
• Emergency assistance for supporting the AU’s 
initiatives concerning Darfur 
8. 67 
 
 
Source: MOFA, 2006 
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What the above table clearly illustrates is that through the principle of the “consolidation 
of peace”, Japan has truly implemented the three pillars as discussed earlier. This 
indicates a clear focus on human security, particularly if one considers that most of the 
initiatives in the above table are in the form of humanitarian assistance, specifically in 
terms of health care and food aid. The projects in table 4.2 also imply that although Japan 
now focuses on promoting humanitarian issues such as health and refugee replacements 
through the concept of human security, the largest disbursements are still for projects 
involving technical assistance and infrastructure repair. Lastly, although Japan did 
contribute significantly in financial terms, it mostly worked through various NGOs. This 
includes UNICEF, the World Food Programme (WFP) and international organisations 
such as the UN and the AU to do the groundwork in Sudan.  
 
In July 2007, Japan announced that it was considering the possibility of dispatching SDFs 
to Darfur. This would be done in line with the planned launch of a joint peacekeeping 
operation by the UN and the AU. One of the key reasons why Japan changed its view on 
sending SDFs is due to the fact that it will be hosting the G8 summit in 2008, and its 
Security Council ambitions still have to be taken into account. Another reason why the 
Japanese have been hesitant to dispatch SDFs is because the conflict in Sudan does not 
meet Japan’s five principles for partaking in peacekeeping operations in foreign 
countries, in particular the principle of “a cease-fire agreement by parties concerned” 
(Sudan Tribune, 2007). 
 
4.6 Role of Japan in multilateral organisations to promote peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding in Africa 
 
4.6.1 United Nations  
 
The fact that Japan only gained UN membership in 1956 means that up until the 1980s, 
Japan played a very low-key role in the organisation (Rose, 2000: 122-124). This is very 
contradictory to the fact that Japan often proclaimed its adoption of “UN-centered policy” 
since it joined the UN (Ishizuka, 2005: 67). While becoming an economic power, and 
now with the second largest economy in the world, Japan has been a major financial 
contributor to the UN even though its participation and representation until the mid- 
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1990s was extremely limited. Japan’s contribution to the UN’s peacekeeping efforts is a 
representation of its role in the organisation as a whole: although Japan’s membership to 
the UN implies that it partakes and assists in peacekeeping, Japan’s contributions have 
remained financial in nature for mainly humanitarian assistance rather than deploying 
physical forces, as discussed in a previous section (Rose, 2000:122-124).  
 
Japan’s direct role in UN peacekeeping missions has been extremely limited, and the 
international community has continuously over the last decade called for Japan to expand 
this role through the UN. However, Japan has contributed immensely in advancing the 
concept of human security through the UN by promoting and establishing the UN Trust 
Fund for Human Security. This added significant strength to the capacity of the UN as a 
policy implementation system in order to advocate human security. The UNDP has also 
been an important forum through which Japan has contributed to development in 
peacekeeping operations, funded by multilateral ODA. It portrays Japan’s willingness to 
exercise active diplomacy via multilateral organisations for promoting its niche 
diplomacy, through the concept of human security (Akiyama, 2004: 13). A key reason 
why Japan’s human security approach has coordinated well with the UN as an 
organisation, particularly in the context of peacekeeping is that the concept of human 
security has been an integral part of positive peace and especially provided peace 
movements in the 1980s with new direction. An Agenda for Peace by Boutros Boutros-
Ghali furthered new thinking on human security, which also gained immense support 
from the MOFA (Peou, 2002: 51). More recently, in June 2007, Japan was elected chair 
of the UN Peacebuilding Commission (MOFA, 2007). This is a clear indication that 
Japan still wishes to focus on peacebuilding rather than peacekeeping. Although it can be 
criticised for still not expanding its role in peacekeeping, Japan has at least adopted a 
leading role in UN peacebuilding.  
 
Japan’s participation in peacekeeping operations through the UN in Africa, has served its 
three most important foreign policy goals in a post-Cold War security structure: 
 
i) establishing itself as a global power, both in political and economic terms; 
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ii) promoting its Security Council ambitions; and 
iii) creating its own niche diplomacy through promoting the concept of human 
security through its ODA to peacekeeping operations. 
 
4.6 2 African Union 
 
A fundamental part of Japan’s foreign policy, under the principle of “the consolidation of 
peace” is its cooperation with international organisations to promote global peace and 
security. As discussed, Japan’s foreign policy is also multilateral in nature, especially in 
the context of its policies on peacekeeping. Although Japan has been participating in 
global conflict peace operations mainly through the UN, it has collaborated with the AU 
as a key partner whilst dealing with conflicts in Africa. The collaboration between the 
AU and Japan is a direct result of the TICAD process, which promotes partnership 
between Japan and Africa. 
 
The AU has been the first recipient of Japanese assistance towards the efforts of African 
regional as well as sub-regional organisations for conflict response. Although the AU has 
been the main regional organisation that Japan has supported in Africa, the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has also been a key player under the flag 
of the AU. Japan has assisted the efforts of the AU for conflict response in terms of 
financial and intellectual contributions. In 1994, Japan provided US$ 10 million to the 
AU through the UNDP which was Japan’s first financial contribution to AUs efforts for 
conflict response (Ochiai, 2001: 43, 44). Japan has also more recently provided the AU 
with US$ 19 million for efforts against the civil war in Darfur. UNMIS was high on the 
priority list of the AUs peacekeeping projects (Reuters, 2006). An example of Japan’s 
second type of assistance in terms of intellectual support was to host a “high level 
symposium” on peace and conflict issues in order for the AU to exchange information 
and to further discussions on the topic with other regional organisations such as 
ECOWAS and SADC (Ochiai, 2001: 43, 44). 
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The following graph illustrates the relationship between Japan and the AU in the context 
of conflict resolution and peacekeeping: 
 
Figure 4.3: Japan-AU High-level Policy Dialogue: Its Background and Significance 
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• AU as body representing 
Africa 
• Independent engagement and 
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Japan’s Policy toward Africa 
 
• TICAD process prioritizes 
African ownership, esp. 
support for NEPAD and AU 
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for NEPAD and PSO, for 
which AU is a focal-point in 
Africa 
• Japan, as a would be non-
permanent member of the 
UNSC, is to assume a more 
assertive role in African 
security issues 
• Leadership in cooperation 
between Africa and Asia 
Significance of Regular Policy Dialogue 
 
• Top-level officials are to discuss concrete measurers to enhance 
cooperation between Japan and both AU and NEPAD 
• Harmonization between AU’s policies and Japan policies for 
Africa centered on TICAD 
• Flexible and non-exclusive framework- providing a focal point 
of dialogue and cooperation between Africa and Asia 
• Valuable information sharing on priorities regarding African 
conflicts and development, esp. in relation to NEPAD policy  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: MOFA, 2004 
 
The above table reaffirms the fact that the AU has been the key African organisation with 
which Japan has collaborated, mostly through policy dialogue. This was to promote 
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peacekeeping on the African continent, based on the principles of the TICAD process. If 
one considers Japan’s policy approach as discussed above, it can be argued that one of 
Japan’s key contributions is of an intellectual nature due to the emphasis being placed on 
policy dialogue. It is also interesting to note that Japan is in no manner diplomatic 
regarding its Security Council ambitions in the above policy outline. As a result it could 
be argued that the AU is a mechanism through which Japan can pursue its foreign policy 
goals in the context of peacekeeping in Africa. 
 
Although Japan’s relationship with the AU is significant in Africa-Japan relations, Ochiai 
(2001: 44) argues that its assistance remains moderate compared to other donor countries, 
especially the US and the UK. One of the key reasons for this is the continuous cuts in its 
ODA budget. The reason why the relationship in the context of peacekeeping with the 
AU has been so comfortable for Japan is because the AU regards conflict prevention as 
more significant than conflict resolution. Japan has therefore never had to provide direct 
technical assistance to the AU. This suits Japan’s pacifist approach to peacekeeping, 
although Japan has without a doubt contributed immensely to the AU in financial and 
intellectual terms. However, in order to promote peace and security on the continent 
Africa’s capacity for conflict resolution has to be drastically advanced. 
 
4.7 Proposals for the future direction of Japan’s role in African peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding missions  
  
As argued in this chapter, Japan chooses to rather focus on peacebuilding than 
peacekeeping, due to the nature of its foreign policy. The following graph illustrates its 
future peacebuilding efforts: 
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 Figure 4.4: Japan’s Future Efforts for Peace Building 
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Ishizuka (2005: 81) argues that in order for Japan to improve its role as contributor to UN 
peacekeeping, three measures should be taken: firstly, the multifunctional trend in 
peacekeeping should encourage Japan to increase the number of personnel it dispatches 
to UN peacekeeping. Secondly, the revised PKO law enables the SDF to join infantry 
battalions for UN peacekeeping, which does not suggest that Japan should entirely shift 
its missions from logistical to military support. Lastly, Japan should consider joining a 
UN Stand-by Arrangement (UNSAS), which is a key pillar of the reform of UN 
peacekeeping operations. By joining UNSAS, certain elements of the SDF selected 
would have rapid-reaction capabilities, whilst obtaining special skills for UN 
peacekeeping missions. 
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As discussed in this chapter, Japan’s foreign policy approach has been a mix between a 
pacifist approach and more recent bold moves. An example would be Japan considering 
sending SDFs to Darfur because of the continued pressure from the international 
community, especially the UN. In contrast to Ishizuka’s argument, Hernandez (2005: 98) 
proposes that Japan should rather build its security role by focusing on non-traditional 
fields. This would include combating transnational crime, including armed robbery at sea 
before partaking in traditional security activities.  
 
Soni (1999) supports this argument by stating that the international community has much 
to gain from Japan’s participation in peacekeeping operations, and rather than criticising 
Japan for ‘doing too little to late’, the international community should welcome its 
collective security efforts and accept the fact that its ‘helmet will be a lighter shade of 
blue’. Although this would be perfectly suitable, taking Japan’s foreign policy towards 
peacekeeping into consideration, it would harm diplomatic relations since Japan can in no 
way be a global player if it does not partake in traditional security activities. Particularly 
if one takes the pressure from the international community to expand its peacekeeping 
role into account. For Japan to expand its peacekeeping role in the near future, Isozaki 
(2005) proposes that the following points should be addressed in the ongoing government 
review process of Japan’s peacekeeping policies: 
 
i) re-establishing basic principles: the constraints of the current Five Principles 
have allowed Japan only to participate after the formal termination of a 
conflict. Thus, in order to be able to expand its peacekeeping through the UN 
(which mostly target civil wars), new principles need to be established; 
ii) building a more effective SDF: increased professional engagement is needed 
in international peace efforts; 
iii) increased dispatches of civilian police: security sector reform is important in 
UN missions, yet the Japanese government should implement an improved 
system of providing training, logistic and financial support for police officers;  
iv) enhancing dispatch of non-governmental experts: there is an increasing need 
for this, since peace missions require civilian expertise; 
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v) strategic use of ODA for international security: importance of cooperation of 
Japanese bureaucracies should be highlighted; 
vi) GHQ of peace operations in the cabinet: general headquarters for 
peacekeeping that directs governmental agencies should be established at the 
cabinet level; and 
vii) having a real national contingent commander: the Japanese contingent 
commander must have authority over the battlefield to effectively deal with 
crises.  
 
These proposals are indeed relevant for Japan’s changing security policy, and given that 
Soeya (2005: 114) argues that “some elements of pacifism have found new forms 
articulating their values and beliefs”, it can be argued that Japan still lacks a coherent 
foreign policy on peace and security, especially considering peacekeeping in African 
countries. 
 
4.8 Conclusion  
 
In this chapter the important relationship between the concept of human security and 
peacekeeping was discussed, in the context of African conflict. Japan’s foreign policy on 
peacekeeping was analysed, as many changes have taken placed when it first deployed 
SDF forces in 1992. Since Japan’s foreign policy is multilateral of nature, its role in key 
international organisations such as the UN and the AU was discussed in order to 
understand Japan’s true contributions and constraints because of its often pacifist stance 
on peacekeeping. Emerging from this chapter is the fact that Japan’s foreign policy on 
peacekeeping is often inconsistent, and that these policies are not in line in terms of what 
the international community expects from it as a middlepower in global politics.  
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 
 
5.1 Summary of study 
 
The main aspect under investigation in this study was in which ways human security, 
both as a concept and principle, has influenced Japan’s foreign policy towards Africa 
since 1998. Key research goals included how the concept of human security has 
influenced foreign policy elements such as ODA and peacekeeping. The study also 
focused on how human security as a political principle and goal of Japan’s foreign policy 
has affected the relations between itself and Africa.  
 
In Chapter Two a historical overview was given of Japan’s relationship with Africa and 
in particular with South Africa, because of the large trade between the countries. The 
main purpose of this chapter was to provide the context for the current political and 
economic relations between Japan and Africa. In Chapter Three the importance of ODA 
in Japan’s foreign policy towards Africa was discussed. It was also shown that the 
concept of human security subsequently influenced Japan’s foreign policy concerning 
ODA following the end of the Cold War. Data was also provided to support the argument 
that Japan’s motives for providing ODA to Africa, has been mainly economic in nature. 
The initiation of the TICAD altered this to some degree. Chapter Four provided an 
analysis of how human security has influenced Japan’s changing security role after the 
Cold War in its participation in United Nations-led peacekeeping operations (PKOs). The 
purpose of this chapter was to analyse a specific Japanese activity in the “new security 
paradigm” where the state is no longer considered as the sole provider of security for its 
people. Equally important was to discern how Japan has adjusted to a new security 
approach since the International Peacekeeping Law was passed by the Diet in 1992. 
 
5.2 Key findings  
 
In Chapter Two the following aspects were highlighted concerning the history of Japan’s 
relations with Africa: the end of the Cold War encouraged a new political relationship 
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between Japan and Africa. This was due to the shift from a bipolar to multipolar security 
order which presented Japan with new diplomatic challenges. Although prior to this 
noteworthy economic relations had existed for more than three decades, economic 
activity between Japan and Africa was still limited. Japan’s trade relationship with South 
Africa also formed the core of its relationship with Africa. Adem (2001) summarised 
Japan’s post-Cold War policy towards Africa appropriately when he argues that it should 
be understood as a function of interplay between economic power and asymmetric 
interdependence on the one hand and culture and diplomacy on the other. The latter 
aspect, in particular, has posed many difficulties for the two key policymaking ministries 
of the Japanese government in terms of presenting a coherent foreign policy towards 
peacekeeping. This has been largely due to the fact that the MOFA and the MITI have 
different economic and diplomatic interests at heart. 
 
Key findings of Chapter Three are firstly the most significant events that indicated a shift 
in Japan’s foreign policy by introducing the concept of human security: firstly, the 1994 
UNDP report had an immense influence on the MOFA, since Japan recognised the 
importance of human insecurities being addressed. The second TICAD meeting in 1998 
is also relevant since the concept of human security was officially acknowledged as being 
central to African development. The revision of the ODA Charter in 2003 also indicated a 
significant policy shift, and human security was much more accentuated and accepted by 
the various government departments. The MOFA had the greatest influence in creating 
policies to promote human security.  
 
In terms of the trends that can be derived from Japan’s ODA patterns from the 1960s 
until the late 1980s, Japanese ODA disbursements were primarily directed to African 
countries where Japan had the most economic interests. For example Kenya, Tanzania 
and Zambia which are rich in natural resources vital to the Japanese economy tended to 
receive larger volumes of aid. Concerning ODA patterns in the 1990s, it is clear that 
diplomatic concerns such as its Security Council ambitions, and creating its own niche 
diplomacy as a middlepower in the new multipolar security order have been key foreign 
policy goals. Although Japan has been one of the main contributors of ODA to Africa 
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following the Cold War, the fact that it made out only a small percentage of its ODA 
budget, implies that it only provided enough in order to serve certain economic and 
diplomatic interests as mentioned, and not purely out of humanitarian concerns. 
Nevertheless, this currently plays a larger role because of the MOFAs focus on human 
security. Since the late 1990s, with the inception of human security as part of Japan’s 
African foreign policy, Japan has directed its ODA for humanitarian projects to address 
human insecurities such as poverty, health, conflict and education. 
 
As a middlepower, it is clear from analysing Japan’s foreign policy that it has selected 
human security for its “niche diplomacy” in the security realm. What has also emerged 
throughout this study is that the overriding diplomatic concern for Japan has been its 
Security Council ambitions: a key reason why much political interest has been shown to 
Africa is because the African bloc carries such a large vote in the UN. 
 
Since the purpose of this study was to analyse the impact of the concept of human 
security on Japan’s foreign policy, Japan’s role in PKOs in Africa was discussed in 
Chapter Four. The fact that Japan has adopted a human security approach towards 
conflict, in order to make up for the pacifist nature of its foreign policy towards PKO’s 
since World War II supports the argument that human security is central to its Africa 
policy. This is mainly due to the fact that it suits Japan’s “non-violence” approach. This 
has also formed part of Japan’s niche diplomacy, since it is addressing some of Africa’s 
most prominent problems in a manner distinct from other developed countries (for 
example the United States of America). A second aspect that has emerged is that the key 
reason for Japan adopting the “consolidation of peace” policy to conflict was in order to 
avoid directly partaking in peacekeeping, and rather to contribute to peacebuilding. The 
latter, it was contended, suits Japan’s current foreign policy on security, which is without 
a doubt characterised by pacifism, as was illustrated through the Sudan case study. 
Through an analysis of Japan’s relationship with multilateral organisations such as the 
African Union and the United Nations, and their role in peacekeeping in Africa, it was 
shown that Japan exhibits a hesitance to directly partake in peacekeeping. No conclusive 
findings were reached on Japan’s foreign policy on human security policies globally, 
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since only African case studies were used. A study, in which international peacekeeping 
operations globally are assessed and how efforts to promote human security have 
influenced Japan’s foreign policy, would be more complete in this regard. This was 
beyond the scope of this study.   
 
The two theoretical perspectives of the new security paradigm, Structural Realism (based 
on Neo-Realism) and the Human Security Approach have been discussed in the context 
of this study. Both proved useful in explaining Japan’s rationale for providing ODA to 
Africa, as well as why human security has formed such an important part of the country’s 
foreign policy. Structural Realism has provided the framework for explaining Japan 
disbursing ODA to African countries where it had the greatest economic interests, as well 
as its more current diplomatic ventures. An example of this would be former Prime 
Minister Mori’s tour of Africa in 2001 when only a selected few African states were 
visited – those most important to Japan in economic and diplomatic terms. On the other 
side of the spectrum, the Human Security Approach aided this study in analysing Japan’s 
humanitarian approach in terms of the type of projects where ODA is directed as well as 
the funding of peacebuilding initiatives. However, Structural Realism has seemed to 
prove more relevant in explaining Japan’s motives for providing ODA, and more 
specifically to which countries it has been disbursed to. On the other hand, the Human 
Security Approach has been more useful in explaining the importance of human security 
in Japan’s approach to developing countries. In this study both theoretical perspectives 
have therefore proved equally useful in understanding different trends and patterns in 
Japan’s African foreign policy. 
 
5.3 Policy recommendations 
 
5.3.1 Improving the efficiency of ODA to Africa 
 
In Chapter Three it has been argued that the effectiveness of Japanese ODA to Africa has 
improved over the last four years, mostly because of the revised Charter in 2003 with the 
new focus on the quality of ODA rather than the quantity. However, because of domestic 
pressures from the public on the MOFA, resulting in political tension between this 
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ministry and the MITI, the continued successful drafting and implementing of ODA 
policies to Africa has been hampered. Under these to two ministries, a first 
recommendation is that organisations central to ODA policymaking such as the Japanese 
Overseas Cooperation, the International Cooperation Bureau, JICA and the JIBC, and 
their efforts should be coordinated and integrated for more coherent ODA policymaking 
and implementation in Africa. Nevertheless, in order to ensure that ODA is disbursed to 
African countries where ODA is needed most, for example health care, more intensive 
country specific research should be conducted on the specific needs of certain African 
countries which do receive ODA from all the organisations.  
 
5.3.2 A more coherent foreign policy for peacekeeping and peacebuilding 
 
As argued in Chapter Four, Japan’s chosen policy of “the consolidation of peace” has 
directed all the focus to peacebuilding activities, rather than peacekeeping. Although this 
approach has proven to be successful, it has not erased all the criticisms from the 
international community, calling for Japan to develop a more active approach to 
peacekeeping. Thus, although Japan has been avoiding this at all costs, it will need to 
develop a more coherent foreign policy on peacekeeping that fits into the context of its 
renewed security role, whilst promoting the concept of human security. This concept can 
be used in all its foreign policies for increased consistency, especially concerning security 
and issues of conflict. 
 
5.3.3 Increasing the promotion of human security through TICAD 
 
Although the TICAD process has emphasised the importance of human security as part of 
its policies for African development, there is room for improvement. More attention 
should be given to promoting human security through the various initiatives that are 
undertaken by TICAD. One measure that can be embarked on is to enhance the 
cooperation between TICAD and NEPAD with human security as a common goal. As 
discussed, there are various criticisms against the past three TICAD conferences in terms 
of its effectiveness. In order for Japan to make a success of TICAD IV to be held in 
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Tokyo in 2008, aid donors, African recipients, and civil society should play a more active 
role in creating measures to promote African development.  
 
5.4 Aspects for further research and conclusion 
 
A further investigation of the trends of Japan’s current ODA disbursements to Africa 
would be feasible, in order to be able to conduct a more complete study of all the African 
countries that receive ODA. Additional attention could also be given to Japan’s foreign 
policy in terms of peacebuilding, and how the MOFA is formulating these policies. To 
make such a study more complete, more African countries that receive ODA for 
peacebuilding from Japan should be analysed since there was only focused on two in this 
study. A comparative study of TICAD and NEPAD, and the feasibility of coordinating 
these two programmes policies for African development can contribute to scholarship on 
African development. Lastly, more research can be conducted on human security, and 
other aspects of it that are promoted through Japan’s foreign policy. Such studies would 
be feasible since this study has shown that Japan can indeed make a contribution to 
African development by promoting human security through its foreign policy. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
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